Mon, Aug 10, 2026
The Saudi Arabia-Turkey-Pakistan defence pact has been the most significant geopolitical event in the first week of August, giving rise to speculation that Saudi Arabia and Turkey may come to Pakistan’s aid if India were to ever launch an “attack” against the neighbour. The pact, though significant, is being overinterpreted in the context of future conflicts between India and Pakistan.
While the Pakistan Army may hope that Riyadh would extend military support during any India-Pakistan conflict, the reality could be different. Saudi Arabia, whose ties with India have been transformed over the past two decades and acquired newer dimensions over the past decade, has little incentive to get drawn into a military conflict with India which is not theirs. Turkey is a close military ally of Pakistan since the Cold War days and did not need a separate pact with Pakistan to extend military support to Islamabad in case of a conflict with India, as was visible during Operation Sindoor.
Saudi Arabia is not merely an oil-producing nation propped up by the US to create wealth. Riyadh, which has embarked on a path of modernisation, is still the pole of the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia is the biggest country by size and economy in the entire Gulf and wider West Asia. While a few other Gulf states have tried to rival Riyadh in terms of their success in recent decades, Saudi Arabia remains the pivot. It is a country that matters regionally and globally and has been locked in a rivalry with Iran for decades. The nuclear pact with the US and the trilateral defence pact, both creating a shield of deterrence, must be viewed in the context of Riyadh’s rivalry with Tehran and not through the narrow prism of Pakistan’s geopolitical goals. Pakistan as a rentier state has a history of arranging boots on the ground in the deserts of Saudi Arabia.
Despite some commentaries relayed from Islamabad and elsewhere, Riyadh has little or no interest in getting embroiled in a conflict with India. Today, the India-Saudi Arabia partnership cannot be analysed based on the Cold War era. The historic visit of the then King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to India in January 2006 was a watershed moment that resulted in the signing of the ‘Delhi Declaration’. It was followed by the ‘Riyadh Declaration’ in 2010 during the visit of the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the Kingdom, which elevated bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership.
The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Riyadh in April 2016 led to an enhanced and comprehensive cooperation in the political, economic, security, and defence realm.
Subsequently, Prime Minister Modi visited Saudi Arabia in 2019 and 2025. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman undertook two visits – 2019 and 2023 – to India to give further momentum to the strategic partnership.
The India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council guides the partnership, and the significance of the partnership can be gauged from the fact that National Security Advisor Ajit Doval was received thrice this year in Riyadh. The Strategic Partnership Council between India and Saudi Arabia was set up in 2019, having two sub-committees, namely the Committee on Political, Security, Social, and Cultural (PSSC) Cooperation, and the Committee on Economy & Investments (E&I). There are eight Joint Working Groups (JWGs) under the two sub-committees.
The economic partnership has been steadily gaining in strength without fanfare associated with India’s other trade and investment partners. Saudi Arabia is India’s fifth largest trade partner, and India is Saudi Arabia’s second largest trade partner. During FY 2024-25, total trade between both countries reached US$41.88 billion, with India’s imports from Saudi Arabia at US$ 30.12 billion and exports to Saudi Arabia worth US$11.76 billion. There are approximately 2,923 Indian companies registered as joint ventures or 100% owned entities in the Kingdom with a total investment of US$ 3 billion (August 2023) in the Kingdom. It is understood that the number has now reached close to 5,000 companies. These investments are across diverse sectors.
Saudi investments in India, including those of Public Investment Fund (PIF), other Saudi companies, and the Saudi-backed Vision Fund, have been about US$10 billion. Apart from PIF, major investment groups from the Kingdom include SABIC, AlFanar, ZAMIL, Abdul Latif Jameel, Al Jomaih and Petromin.
While India nurtures its ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) across sectors, Saudi Arabia needs equal attention, and all efforts must be made to boost the strategic partnership. It would be prudent for India to stay neutral in any Saudi-UAE competition in the Gulf and beyond the region.
Since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the loss of its territory, Turkey has been nursing a dream to recreate the Caliphate. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is determined to regain Turkey’s lost glory, if not through regaining territories but through regaining influence across the Islamic world, including West Asia and has eyes set on Eurasia.
This brings Turkey into direct conflict with Saudi Arabia. Ankara, led by President Erdogan, played smart to position itself as a defence “powerhouse” for the Gulf and bargained with Riyadh to create the trilateral defence pact, also involving Pakistan, which is a close military ally of Turkey and has a defence pact with Saudi Arabia.
However, there are inherent contradictions in Turkey’s outreach.
While Turkey has helped Saudi Arabia create deterrence against Iran and also Israel, Turkey enjoys diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, and there are limited challenges in its ties with Iran. The primary goal of Turkey - also a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - is to extend its influence across West Asia, North Africa, and East Africa while eyeing South Asia.
India needs to keep a close watch on Ankara’s ambitions and any move by Pakistan under the trilateral pact to draw it into a conflict with India. New Delhi must play smart to keep Riyadh engaged, which had appraised it before it signed a defence pact with Pakistan in 2025 and had probably indicated a possible trilateral defence pact to prevent any step to harm India’s security interests.
(The writer is a commentator on geopolitics and geoeconomics. Views expressed are personal.)