Fri, Sep 18, 2026
Consider a Chinese president travelling abroad for a multilateral summit and holding a bilateral meeting on its margins. That is precisely what happened during Xi Jinping’s 24-hour visit to India for the BRICS Summit 2026 — his first visit to the country in seven years. At their September 12 meeting, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for the third consecutive year, stressed the need to maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), highlighting the agreements from the 1990s and the 2000s.
The efforts to normalise Sino-Indian ties are not only about preventing border clashes and building an economic partnership but also about realpolitik: a G-2 (US-China) is taking shape, while the US-India ties are facing real-time challenges.
For, after all, the trajectory of ties depends on peace along the LAC. The progress in keeping the LAC peaceful since the two leaders met in 2024 in Kazan has been steady but slow.
Several meetings have been organised since the Kazan spirit to manage the LAC, and the New Delhi summit was yet another occasion to remind Xi of the necessity for a peaceful border between the neighbours. The new mechanisms put in place this year and last year are expected to lead to management of tensions.
The 25th Round of India–China Special Representatives (SR) talks held in Beijing between India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi produced an eight-point consensus, including discussions on an “Early and Substantial Harvest” in boundary delimitation, additional military communication channels, border management, and trans-border river cooperation.
While the LAC did not witness any transgressions during the Chinese President’s visit, unlike in 2014 or 2017 (before the Indian Prime Minister’s China visit for the BRICS Summit), the first meeting of the Sino-Pak joint boundary commission immediately after the India-China leadership meeting can be a spoiler. Pakistan and China do not share a border, and it was Pakistan that had ceded illegally occupied Indian territory to China six decades ago. Any attempt to showcase the Sino-Pak border and reaffirm the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project through Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) will only backfire. The goal should be to focus on consensus reached during the SR talks and leadership-level meeting, and work towards managing the LAC, delimitation, and early harvest.
India desires China to increase its investments through joint ventures in non-sensitive sectors, boosting the manufacturing sector and creating favourable conditions for Indian exports. This would essentially bridge the trade gap.
As a confidence-building measure, China must refrain from weaponising supply chains of critical items. Modi specifically raised this concern with Xi. Indian businesses are hoping that Beijing would bring predictability while ensuring supplies of items such as permanent magnets, besides fertilizers.
The other recent high-level diplomatic engagements (including talks between Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal and Wang Wentao) signal mutual intent to address trade frictions and economic concerns in a "balanced manner". But the proof of the pudding is in its eating. Chinese entrepreneurs should start looking actively at investing in the green energy sector in India and railway and road infrastructure projects through joint ventures. This will be beneficial to both sides.
Similarly, Indian industrial goods have prospects in Chinese markets if Beijing decides to restructure barriers hindering Indian exporters.
Meanwhile, the US will be less and less incentivised to have India as a counter-balance to China. But Delhi needs to have a pragmatic and working relationship with Beijing instead of living in a perpetual world of animosity. China needs to recognise that India is not a champion of bloc politics and unlikely to be a treaty ally of the US. Strategic autonomy is the cardinal principle of India’s foreign policy strategy, and Delhi would continue to hedge to serve its national interests.
(The writer is a commentator on geopolitics and geoeconomics. Views expressed are personal.)