Paramilitary Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) battalions, jungle warfare units, fortified police stations, helicopters, communication networks, weapons, and sprawling logistics chains… it was an elaborate security apparatus mounted across impregnable forest terrain. 

With the government declaring India free of leftwing extremism on 31 March 2026, what happens to this enormous setup now that still sits in parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha?

The answer is unlikely to be a dramatic withdrawal. The more plausible outcome is a gradual conversion of counter-insurgency capacity into permanent policing, intelligence, and civilian infrastructure. 

Some assets will be withdrawn, some redeployed, and others retained to prevent any resurgence of Maoist activity, official sources say.

“The government has consistently argued that the objective of CAPF deployment was not to create a permanent substitute for state policing, but to provide security while state police and civilian institutions were strengthened. As the threat recedes, that logic points towards fewer large-scale jungle deployments, and greater reliance on state police and permanent stations,” a senior official in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) told The Secretariat.

The Range Of Operations

CAPF units deployed in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha also perform other national security duties, while state police, roads, telecommunications, aviation, intelligence infrastructure, and development projects were financed through separate budget heads.

The government had set up 361 new security camps, 586 fortified police stations, and over 8,500 mobile towers in areas affected by leftwing extremism by December 2025.

The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) alone has 67 leftwing extremism General Duty battalions and 10 Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA). Seven CoBRA units are listed in Chhattisgarh, two in Jharkhand, and one in Odisha. 

Around this combat structure sits an even larger support system, including communications and signal units, workshops, hospitals, training establishments, and administrative formations.

Every remote camp also represented a logistics operation. 

Food, drinking water, fuel, generators, medical supplies, ammunition, protective equipment, communications gear, and vehicles had to reach locations often far from conventional road networks. Roads and bridges had to be secured before they could become reliable supply routes. Helicopters provided mobility, casualty evacuation, and resupply.

Thinning Of Security Footprint

The most likely transition is a thinning of the security footprint. 

“A CRPF battalion withdrawn from Bastar, however, does not necessarily disappear. It can be moved to another internal security theatre, a border, election duty, disaster response or another national requirement. The same applies to specialised capabilities,” the MHA official said.

“CoBRA units, jungle-warfare expertise, intelligence networks, and communications systems represent years of institutional investment. They are unlikely to be dismantled merely because the campaign against leftwing extremism has entered a new phase,” the official said.

“Some could be redeployed; others may remain as a central reserve against a possible revival. The deployment of CoBRA battalions in Manipur illustrates how specialised capabilities can acquire a second operational life outside the Maoist theatre.”

However, the more consequential transformation may occur on the ground. 

Military Footprint To Governance Footprint

A security camp is, by definition, a physical manifestation of state presence. “Once its counter-insurgency function diminishes, the same site can potentially become a police station, administrative centre, health facility, school, telecommunications node or multi-service government centre,” the official said, adding that the process has already begun in Bastar.

“In May 2026, an initiative was announced to convert former security camps into one-stop public-service centres, bringing government schemes and services closer to tribal communities,” the official noted.

As the Maoist challenge was never solely a military problem, its persistence was also linked to the absence, weakness, or inaccessibility of ordinary state institutions across difficult terrain. The post-insurgency test will be whether a security footprint can be converted into a governance footprint.

Communication, Intelligence Infrastructure

More than 9,000 telecom towers had been commissioned under initiatives to tackle leftwing extremism by December 2025, alongside major investments in roads, digital connectivity, and financial infrastructure.

The networks initially built or expanded to support security operations can now serve a very different purpose: mobile connectivity, banking, education, healthcare, emergency response, and routine policing. The strategic value of such infrastructure may ultimately outlast the security emergency that helped create it.

Not everything will have such an easy second life. 

Specialised command-and-control systems and intelligence infrastructure may be absorbed into state police organisations, retained centrally, mothballed or redeployed. The objective will be to preserve institutional memory and capability without maintaining the full wartime footprint.

Rehabilitation Efforts

Rehabilitation and criminal justice operate on separate tracks. 

Between 2024 and March 2026, over 3,900 Maoist cadres surrendered, including 2,337 in 2025 alone.

A surrendered cadre may receive financial assistance, vocational training, and a monthly stipend while criminal cases continue through the courts.

Under the current rehabilitation framework, the government provides an immediate grant of ₹5 lakh for higher-ranking cadres and ₹2.5 lakh for others, besides ₹10,000 a month for 36 months and incentives for surrendering weapons. 

The challenge now is to distinguish genuine reintegration into society from attempts to rebuild underground networks. That requires verification, local intelligence, police records and attention to unresolved criminal cases.

The Weapons Stockpile

Weapons create another, less visible legacy, as firearms and ammunition seized, recovered, or surrendered during the conflict do not simply become available for redistribution. 

They enter government custody, are documented, and transferred through authorised Central or state firearm bureaus. Weapons are examined and classified according to their condition, with disposal or destruction governed by prescribed legal procedures.

A recovered rifle could be evidence in a murder, ambush, or arms-trafficking investigation. Its markings, ballistic characteristics, and forensic history may remain relevant years after the insurgency has ended. Consequently, large quantities of recovered weapons cannot necessarily be destroyed immediately. 

The eventual stockpile will include serviceable firearms, obsolete weapons, locally manufactured guns, explosives, and ammunition. Some may have evidentiary value, some may be retained under authorised procedures, and much will ultimately have to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of according to law.

India’s Maoist war is thus entering a different phase: the conversion of a wartime security architecture into the permanent machinery of the government.