Thu, Nov 12, 2026
Israeli President Isaac Herzog invited the leader of the opposition alliance Gadi Eisenkot to form the new government, replacing Benjamin Netanyahu who had dominated Israeli politics for over two decades.
The fiercely contested national elections yielded a split outcome for the 120-member Knesset. The Netanyahu bloc lost its majority and got 53 seats, and the opposition alliance fell short with 48 seats, while the Arab parties doubled representation to 19 seats, making them hard to ignore.
Post-election consultations further eroded Netanyahu’s support to 46, as a religious party did not endorse him for Prime Minister, while Eisenkot’s base expanded to 67, with Arab parties extending support, in a bid to oust Netanyahu.
Israel’s robust democracy provides space for diverse perspectives but rarely produces clear majority; coalitions are the norm. These elections may have halted the Netanyahu era, but few are ready to write him off. The right wing still has sizeable presence.
For Eisenkot, coalition building and governance will remain complicated. Securing support from orthodox religious groups or negotiating a role for Arab parties will be challenging. In contrast, regional affairs may open new hope. For India, the robust multi-sectoral strategic partnership will not only endure but continue to strengthen.
The elections, the first after the 7 October massacre, came while the nation faced threats of long-term conflict, economic crisis, challenge to democratic institutions, and global isolation.
The topmost question was the political future of Netanyahu. Political parties were divided. Bibi, as he’s generally called, had been at the helm of Israel’s alliance with the US and its growth as a power, but was also seen as responsible for expansion of conflict in the region, reduced public support in the US and isolation with allies in Europe.
For citizens, the weakening of democratic institutions, inability to take action on corruption charges against him, and attempts by his rightwing government to take control of judiciary, media, and intelligentsia that balanced power were important and the subject of public protests for years. In the elections, his Likud party and rightwing partners saw weakened support while anti-Netanyahu votes surged. The sentiment to oust him grew stronger after the elections, when his own coalition partner, United Torah Judaism, declined to support him and an unexpected coalition of opposition partners emerged in the Knesset.
Second, Israel faces a complicated security situation. While the State acquired a semblance of security due to weakening of neighbours and Iran through conflict, individual citizens felt more vulnerable. There is also a sense of battle weariness. The 7 October massacre, Israel's military response in Gaza and aggressive occupation by settlers in the West Bank hardened sentiments on both sides.
Netanyahu’s seven-front conflict had imposed a heavy cost on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and reservists, who had to give up regular jobs for active duty of three to four months in a year. This raised questions about the exemptions provided to orthodox Jews. The elections gave fewer seats than before to orthodox Shas and UTJ parties; but they may still leverage their votes in support of Eisenkot to retain exemptions on conscription and preferential economic treatment. This is a delicate matter in Israel and change may take time.
Third, on the ideology issue, there has been mainstreaming towards the centre and right during the Netanyahu period. The ultra-right such as Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism grew in confidence, and leftist parties shrank in influence, apart from the Democrat party. After 7 October, ideological and political support for Zionism and ultra-right factions was entrenched further. Only the Haredim orthodox religious Jewish parties and Arab parties do not fully identify with the idea of Zionism. This led to the weakening of peace initiatives and a more robust approach against Palestinians, military action in Gaza, and settler activity in the West Bank.
Fourth, Arab representation, a less discussed subject in the past has now become important in view of political dynamics and the need for their support to maintain the coalition. Arabs constitute 20% of the population but have lesser representation in parliament, government, and IDF. Netanyahu’s claim that votes had been stolen by Arabs and there was foreign funding sought to discredit any alliance with Arabs. Trust remains weak.
However, there is an opportunity for the Joint List and Ra’am Arab parties to participate more actively in national affairs and for Eisenkot’s coalition to improve cooperation for better minority relations and trust building for stability and prosperity.
The immediate task for Eisenkot and his Yashar party will be to build a coalition that can form a stable government and balance the agenda of partners.
The first task will be consolidating Jewish partners in his bloc - Together party led by Naftali Bennett, Democrats party led by Yair Golan and especially Yisrael party led by Avigdor Lieberman (who refuses to accept Arab support). Orthodox religious parties could consider support if conscription is kept off the table. Yashar may even try to win over certain Likud members. Finally, Yashar may have to explore the external support of Arab parties. The conventional logic in Israeli politics had been that the ruling coalition must have 61 members from the Jewish parties in the Knesset while the Arabs could lend additional support. Control of the Knesset, under Likud dominance for long, will be another priority and the appointment of a new Speaker may be the first step.
Ideologically, Eisenkot and Netanyahu share similar strategic and security objectives for Israel but differ in terms of the use of diplomatic and military leverage and tactics. Eisenkot’s domestic agenda and priorities for the region may be influenced by the alliances he needs to maintain the coalition.
On domestic issues, Eisenkot seeks to maintain the independence of the judiciary and plans to repeal the judicial overhaul initiated by the rightwing government. On the 7 October issue, he has demanded a state commission enquiry to determine responsibility and failures. On the trial of Netanyahu, he has called for accountability and clean governance with strict adherence to the rule of law. His approach to economic policy is based on budget restructuring to tackle the rising cost of living and facilities for IDF. He has proposed removal of exemptions on conscription enjoyed by orthodox Jews, though this may need more coordination.
On the Palestinian issue, he does not support the two-State formula, but is open to a diplomatic framework on the future of Gaza. He is committed to the complete disarmament of Hamas, which will improve Israel's security and may give an opportunity for the revival of other political forces. On the West Bank, he has opposed annexation and extremist violence and proposes to prosecute violent settlers, which may give the Palestinian Authority an opportunity to stabilise the area.
On regional affairs, Eisenkot’s approach is to limit hard military action and pursue negotiated options for peace and stability and to improve Israel’s global status. He supports diplomatic efforts with strong deterrent force and compact buffer zones but does not favour the aggression in Netanyahu's Greater Israel project. This could lead to cooperation with Arab states and other parties to stabilise the region. On Iran, he favours diplomatic options but will undertake limited targeted offensive action if nuclear issues resurface. On the critical Israel-US relations, he seeks better coordination at an institutional level to regain bipartisan support.
On India, Eisenkot’s familiarity comes from the time he was the Chief of Staff of IDF. The importance of our strategic partnership and potential for collaborative activity for regional stability is recognised.
If Israel’s diplomatic initiatives calm the region, the potential for bilateral and plurilateral cooperation on major projects such as IMEC (the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor) and I2U2 (comprising India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US) will also improve.
India-Israel relations saw significant improvement in the Netanyahu era and built a partnership of trust and confidence. Our ties promise to continue to deepen and expand in multiple sectors through institutional linkages and future oriented engagement in endeavours for regional peace, stability and prosperity.
(The writer is a former diplomat and currently Professor at Jindal Global University)