As things stand, the IAF has 29 fighter squadrons against an authorised strength of 42.5.

The IAF chief was also forthright that delays in aircraft procurement, especially the indigenous platforms, are no longer strategically affordable. He stated that this included the possibility of examining alternative platforms if the fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is delayed.

This exposes a structural weakness in India’s military modernisation: the country is slowly catching up in the design of sophisticated weapon systems, but struggles to bring them into service at the rate and within the timeframe that its strategic circumstances and enhanced threat perception demand.

Air combat rewards mass as much as sophistication.

A Rafale, with its sensors, electronic-warfare kit and Meteor beyond-visual-range missiles, can dominate an engagement. It cannot be in two places at once. Two superb squadrons cannot cover every threatened frontier while preserving reserves. India’s air force needs more than a technological edge; it needs the numbers to use it.

The proposed purchase of 114 additional Rafales, under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft programme and valued at roughly US$ 34–39 billion, is therefore a vital bridge. The French jets would replace MiG-21s and, eventually, ageing Jaguars and Mirage 2000s, adding sensor fusion, electronic protection, and long-range precision strike. But contracts, production, training, and squadron conversions take years. Even 114 Rafales cannot quickly repair a shortfall of more than 13 squadrons accumulated over two decades.

The burden of delay falls on older aircraft. The Jaguar, in Indian service since 1979, still provides deep-strike capability, but its airframes and engines are old. India operates roughly 120 in about six squadrons, and has even sought retired Jaguars from Britain and Oman for spares.

The Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 fleets pose similar problems. The Su-30MKI remains the backbone; its modernisation — radar-absorbent Indian paint, more capable Russian air-to-air missiles and improved BrahMos integration — should help. Yet an upgraded old fighter is still an old fighter. What matters is not squadrons on paper but serviceable aircraft that can generate sorties and endure a prolonged campaign.

The Tejas Mirage 

The Tejas Mk1A was meant to relieve that pressure. Instead, its troubles have become a test of India’s defence-industrial system. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) contracted in 2021 to build 73 Mk1As and 10 trainers; a further order for 97 followed in 2025. The jet has an active electronically scanned array radar and improved electronic warfare. It is a genuine industrial achievement. Its value, however, depends on delivery.

The immediate bottleneck is GE Aerospace’s F404 engine. Because an aircraft is designed around its engine, India has little choice but to wait. GE recently supplied four engines, but has overall delivered only about 10 against an original order of 99. That has left HAL unable to complete aircraft at the planned pace and pushed the programme critically behind schedule. HAL has expanded capacity to 24 aircraft a year.

Radar and electronic-warfare integration, flight-control software certification, weapons qualification, and domestic suppliers all impose “last mile” delays. The deeper problem is programme management: HAL must synchronise suppliers and deliver combat-ready aircraft, not merely airframes. With 180 Mk1As on order, every slip disrupts force planning and increases pressure on the Tejas Mk2 and AMCA.

Air Vice Marshal (retired) Sushil Nanodkar, former Assistant Chief of Air Staff, told the Secretariat, “The LCA, an idea born in l984 and delivered to an operational Unit in 2016, has been a huge showstopper for the force structure planning for the IAF. While we can keep blaming HAL, there was also a delay in the Aeronautical Development Agency’s delivery of aircraft designs.  How was HAL to produce the platform? In the end, there were many gains too. However, timely delivery is the need of the hour. Till we achieve that reality in a realistic and competitive timeframe, IAF must be given the capacity and capability, through imports, to defend the entire area of its responsibility.”

The Tejas Mk2 is meant to bridge the gap between the light fighter and the heavy Su-30MKI, and to succeed the Mirage 2000 and MiG-29. Designed around the more powerful GE F414 engine, it has slipped beyond its early-2026 first-flight target; 2028 now looks optimistic.

A first flight is not a squadron: testing, software integration, and weapons certification take years. Every delay pushes replacement of ageing aircraft into the next decade.

AMCA The Next Gen Ambition 

AMCA is a bigger bet: a twin-engine, low-observable fighter with internal weapons carriage and advanced sensors, intended to operate against modern air defences. The government approved its prototype-development phase in 2024, with five prototypes planned and a first flight targeted for 2029.

That timetable requires India to master stealth structures, specialist materials, propulsion, sensors, software, and weapons integration at once. For a country still working to field an advanced fourth-generation fighter in the Tejas Mk2, it is a considerable leap.

Group Captain (Retd) U.K. Devnath explains the dilemma of the AMCA: “The Indian Air Force has only got some mock-up on the ground, and by the time it takes first test flight, it could be around 2030 or beyond, while both China and Pakistan are already in the process of acquiring fifth-generation aircraft. India needs to consider whether it can wait so long for something which is on the drawing board at the moment.”

This indeed is the problem. Time is running out. 

Beyond The Fighters 

The shortage is not confined to fighters. India’s six Russian-built Il-78MKI tankers have struggled with availability, limiting the air force’s ability to extend fighter endurance and sustain patrols.

Earlier tanker purchases collapsed amid disputes over cost and commercial terms. Leasing aircraft or converting airliners into tankers may help, but no durable replacement fleet exists yet at the required scale.

Drones Make IAF Combat Ready 

Drones and air defences offer brighter news. Operation Sindoor in May 2025 showed the growing importance of unmanned aircraft, loitering munitions, electronic warfare, and integrated air defence.

India used armed drones against air-defence-related targets in Pakistan; Harop loitering munitions combine surveillance with precision attack, especially against radar emissions. Indigenous Nagastra munitions point to cheaper, locally made strike options.

The air force’s known unmanned inventory includes Heron and Searcher surveillance aircraft, along with Harop and Harpy loitering munitions. These are useful, but not substitutes for a fighter fleet. The next task is to link drones, fighters, surveillance networks and air defences through reliable communications and command systems. Unmanned systems can multiply combat power; they cannot replace the aircraft that control the sky.

The policy choice is sequencing and execution. Rafale offers high-end capability now. Tejas Mk1A must move into reliable production, Mk2 must progress without repeated slippage, AMCA must receive the resources and industrial structure required for a credible programme, and the tanker fleet must be modernised. The proposed 114-fighter acquisition could provide a larger bridge, but its value will depend on how quickly aircraft reach operational units and how much domestic manufacturing capability the contract creates.

Growing Air Defence Capability

India’s air-defence capability is robust and growing.  India is sharpening its sensor-to-shooter chain: the radars that establish a track, the command network that assigns a weapon, and the interceptor that must defeat the target within its engagement envelope.

The principal long-range system is the Russian S-400, supported by the indigenous Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM) system Akash, with the ground-based Rajendra radar providing target tracking and missile-control functions. Its published engagement envelope is approximately 4.5–25 km in range and 100 m–20 km in altitude. Its ability to engage multiple targets, operate from mobile platforms and resist electronic countermeasures makes it relevant to the defence of airbases and other fixed installations. The S-400 adds a longer-range engagement layer against aircraft and selected missile threats, although its effective reach depends on the interceptor variant, target altitude, radar horizon and target characteristics.

Low-level guns, man-portable missiles and counter-unmanned-aircraft systems provide the terminal lattice layer against targets that penetrate the outer defences. This is a potent mixed inventory, with different generations of radar, guidance, and communications equipment.

India is close to approving plans to modify six second-hand Boeing 767 airframes into Multi-Mission Tanker Transport (MMTT) aircraft. This will sustain expeditionary capability for the Indo-Pacific role of the IAF.

Going forward, the operational challenge is to maintain a coherent engagement picture across the entire net defence.

As new IAF chief Air Marshal Ashutosh Dixit takes charge, he has a force of war, proven combat calibre for the modern world of warfighting. He also has a major headache: that far too many Indian defence projects have deadlines beyond visual range.

(The writer is a senior journalist and analyst. Views expressed are personal.)