India has shown interest in the France-led Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and has also joined its rival, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), as a dialogue partner. But its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), the country’s first indigenous fifth-generation fighter programme, has yet to conduct its maiden flight.

That is precisely hedging its bets. 

This is reminiscent of the 2007 Sukhoi-HAL Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) project and the 2010 AMCA (earlier known as MCA) programme. 

Diversion Of Funds   

The problem at hand is funding.

In July, Defence Secretary R.K. Singh made it clear that India doesn’t want to purchase any new Sukhoi—without naming Russia’s fifth-generation fighter Su-57—and instead focus on the ₹60,000- ₹65,000 crore Super Sukhoi upgrade programme. 

India also plans to purchase 114 more Rafales under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft programme, for around ₹3.25 lakh crore, with 18 delivered in fly-away condition and the rest assembled locally.

Finally, the mega AMCA project will cost around ₹80,000 crore- ₹15,000 crore for five prototypes and a structural test aircraft, besides ₹65,000 crore for mass production.

That brings us to the central question: If crores have already been earmarked for these three programmes, where will the government source funds if it takes the FCAS flight? 

Bearing The Cost

The FCAS’s cost was initially pegged at around $116 billion. India’s share of the cost, funding and details about technology transfer are unclear, as New Delhi hasn’t joined the programme formally.

Similarly, the GCAP will be extremely expensive, with the UK, Japan, and Italy having already invested more than $6 billion in the design phase alone. Estimates suggest that one fighter could cost around $600 million. 

On one hand, the government is focused on indigenisation and doesn’t want to divert funds from the AMCA project to buying the Su-57. On the other hand, it’s eager to join the FCAS. 

The dissonance is striking. 

Designing a sixth-generation jet is a different ballgame. India has high aspirations and strategic vision, but lacks the technological foundation to incorporate artificial intelligence (AI), perfect manned-unmanned collaboration, and develop network-centric warfare capabilities, advanced sensors, and propulsion for a sixth-generation fighter. 

The engine is the heart of a fighter jet—the most critical and complex part demanding the highest standards of design and development. 

And, as a matter of fact, India has never built a fighter jet engine – an anomaly in defence indigenisation and fifth- and sixth-generation fighter ambitions.

India built the GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri engine for the Tejas, but it failed. HAL became permanently dependent on the General Electric F404-GE-IN20 engine for Tejas Mk1 and the upgraded Tejas Mk1A and F414-GE-INS6 engine for the advanced Tejas Mk2. 

HAL's Failure

Delay in F404-GE-IN20 engine delivery was a major reason for HAL’s failure to deliver the Tejas Mk1 on time and for the lack of Tejas Mk1A.

Shockingly, HAL took 16 years to complete the delivery of 40 Mk1s, with the last two trainers delivered this month.  

Of the 120 Mk1As ordered by the Indian Air Force in 2021 and 2025, not one has been delivered, with HAL having 27 airframes but only 10 engines.

Similarly, delays in F414-GE-INS6 engine delivery were a reason for HAL missing the Tejas Mk2 deadline despite approval in 2022. The first flight, expected in 2023, is now scheduled for 2027.    

HAL and GE Aerospace have still not signed a deal to co-produce around 80% of the F414-GE-INS6 engines despite concluding key technical agreements after a prolonged stand-off over cost escalation and IP rights.

The same engine is expected to power the AMCA Mk1, raising the possibility of India again facing problems without an indigenous engine. 

For the advanced variant, Mk2, India wants to co-produce the engine while having the IP rights, while the foreign partner provides engineering expertise, technology, and design guidance. 

To maintain the AMCA project’s deadline, HAL was kept out, and private players were invited. 

Process Delay

However, the process was delayed before it could take off.  

In May, requests for proposals were issued to Tata Advanced Systems, an L&T-BEL-Dynamatic consortium, and a Bharat Forge-BEML-Data Patterns consortium to be a development-cum-production partner, with a 60-day window to respond. 

The three bidders failed even to present comprehensive technical and financial proposals in 60 days, forcing the government to extend the bidding submission deadline from August 27 to October 31. 

No Indian private aerospace firm has ever produced a fighter jet. Expecting inexperienced private players to meet AMCA project deadlines is unrealistic—the delay in submitting proposals for the programme proves it.

In this situation, joining a sixth-generation fighter project is impractical.

(The writer is a columnist and journalist. Views expressed are personal.)