Tue, Sep 29, 2026
China is increasing the strength, striking power, and reach of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, having already surpassed the US Navy in the number of ships.
Recent commercial satellite imagery shows that China is constructing two next-generation Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN) of different classes.
One submarine, with a shrouded pump-jet propulsor, 120 metres long and a prospective Type 095, was seen at Bohai Shipyard, Huludao.
The other SSN, with an unusually low sail, a 120-metre hull and probably of 09VA class, was spotted at Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai.
SSNs are more useful because conventional wars are more likely. Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines are only useful in a nuclear war, which won’t happen
China’s rapid military innovation and advancement aim to counter the US in the Indo-Pacific, especially in a future war over Taiwan.
However, the Chinese strategy will also have long-term repercussions for India.
India’s SSBNs, the third leg of its nuclear triad, ensure its second-strike capability if nuclear ballistic missiles and air bases are destroyed in an attack.
All three of India’s SSBNs, or boomers, operate out of Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh), the headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command.
In future, boomers and other submarines will operate from the under-construction INS Varsha, India’s dedicated secret underwater nuclear submarine base with pens, tunnels and bunkers at Rambilli, 50 km south of Visakhapatnam.
From the base, India can stealthily deploy submarines into the Bay of Bengal to counter China in the region.
On the western coast, INS Kadamba in Karwar (Karnataka), along the Arabian Sea, under Project Seabird, houses carrier strike groups (CSGs), other ships and diesel-electric attack submarines, or ship submersible killer (SSK).
Therefore, Chinese SSNs pose a major threat to Indian naval bases, especially where SSBNs, CSGs, and SSKs are based.
In 2013, China deployed a Shang-class SSN in the Indian Ocean for the first time on the pretext of anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.
In 2014, a Song-class SSK docked in the Colombo Port, India’s backyard, twice.
India failed to realise the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in China’s maritime strategy, called the “String of Pearls”.
In 2015, a Yuan-class air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarine docked at the Karachi Port, alarming India.
Over the last 10-plus years, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Submarine Force has gained critical operational experience, and in the IOR, with its submarines and other ships docking in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
The biggest concern is that India doesn’t even have one SSN despite Chinese attack submarines docking in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
It’s an anomaly not to have an SSN while competing with China for dominance in the IOR.
An SSN is indispensable and more useful and dangerous in a conventional war, as it can also track and target an SSBN.
India had two SSNs, but both were leased - Charlie-class INS Chakra I (from the erstwhile USSR) and Akula-class INS Chakra II (from Russia). Akula-class INS Chakra III was supposed to have been delivered in 2025 but has been delayed to 2028 due to the Russia-Ukraine War.
India realised the importance of nuclear attack submarines as late as 2024, when the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the construction of two of the six planned indigenous SSNs under Project 77, which will cost ₹1.2 lakh crore. The two submarines will cost ₹45,000 crore, with the first completed by 2036-37 and the second by 2038-39.
The US has 71 submarines, including 14 SSBNs and 53 SSNs - and China aims to beat it in numbers, capabilities and technology.
According to the US Office of Naval Intelligence, China aims to have around 40 SSNs by 2035, including new classes of attack submarines. China also wants to build 20-30 Ship Submersible Guided (Missile) Nuclear (SSGNs) carrying cruise and ballistic missiles.
China is focused on building SSNs and SSGNs because they are critical to the A2/AD military strategy in countering both the US and India.
Under the strategy, missiles, long-range air defence, submarines and counter-space/cyber tools prevent the adversary from accessing the contested area.
If the adversary enters the contested area, short-range air defence, coastal missiles, mines, and electronic warfare limit manoeuvrability.
China will use SSNs in the A2/AD strategy to track and hunt down enemy ships using torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles and attack coastal batteries and radars using Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs).
On the other hand, Chinese SSNs can also challenge the adversary’s A2/AD strategy by moving undetected by surface radars and aerial surveillance and dodging missile networks.
Stealth, speed, agility, and endurance serve both purposes.
(The writer is a columnist and journalist. Views expressed are personal.)