To this end, it needs to focus on a neighbourhood-first policy, much like the one crafted by late US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, while balancing New Delhi’s relations with its Western allies and a growing Asiatic super-power in China.

That Prime Minister Narendra Modi wishes to continue his engagements with India’s neighbours was underlined when he invited heads of state from the seven South Asian nations to his swearing-in ceremony for a third term. 

In what could be seen as a testimony to the importance of their ties with India, all of them including President of the Maldives, Mohammed Muizzu who had taken a markedly pro-China and anti-India stance in the past, did take the trouble of turning up. Pakistan was the sole exception from the invitation list, predictably. 

Modi’s stated “muscular” foreign policy and Pakistan’s continued proxy war against India negated the possibility of an immediate rapprochement, which may have been economically beneficial to both nations, and possibly a popular move on both sides of the border in Punjab. 

The imperatives of engaging with Pakistan remain, not least of all to stave off a stronger China-Pakistan axis that could expand in the future westwards towards Iran or Russia, with both of whom the duo enjoy the best of relations. 

As the NDA 3.0 coalition engages in foreign policy realpolitiks, hopefully fresh thinking and  out-of-box approaches could win over an economically weakened Pakistan by trading commercial ties for peace to realise India’s dream of a truly peaceful neighbourhood, where “one could breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dine at Kabul.”

Just as the Americans in the 19th century had a “hands-off policy” propounded by US President James Monroe toward Latin America to keep out European powers, India’s stance in the decades since its birth had been one of decrying attempts by great powers to interfere in South Asia.

During the tenure of Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister, India’s South Asian doctrine changed just as America’s did during Franklin D Roosevelt’s presidency to a “good neigbour policy”, focussing more on regional integration and economic ties. In some senses this was an enlargement of the policies of prime ministers I.K Gujral and Atal Behari Vajpayee, who tried to engage more closely with India’s neighbours, especially Pakistan. 

The Modi government, which saw it fit to continue with this policy, found its greatest ally in Bangladesh in furthering New Delhi’s push to integrate the region through a chain of roads, railways, ports, and energy grids, in Bangladesh. 

Dhaka Calling

The first signs of an opening up with Dhaka, inimical towards India since the killing of Sheikh Mujib, came during the military-backed caretaker government’s rule and then flowered after Sheikh Hasina came to power.

The Bangladeshi premier has been a “frequent flyer” to New Delhi and will be  flying in on Friday, her second trip in a month to India, ahead of a visit to Beijing in a display of how much she values Indian sensitivities.

However, the challenge now is to take those relations forward by espousing win-win deals that silence anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh, which could jeopardise the web of connectivity that  is now being built in the region. 

Just as the Maldives saw a controversial “India Out '' campaign during its elections last year, Bangladesh also witnessed a similar campaign – although not so viral – orchestrated by the opposition earlier this year.

The deltaic nation, whose per capita income has risen two-and-a-half-fold in the last 10 years to about US$ 2,700, depends on foreign trade to propel its growth.  But it faces the possibility of its duty-free access to many markets ending as it graduates out of the least developed status in 2026. 

India can and should give it guaranteed and better access to its vast marketplace by closing a comprehensive economic and trade treaty that continues with duty-free market access. This could involve toning down non-tariff barriers to Bangladesh’s exports (mostly of garments and jute) and allowing two-way investment and highly skilled personnel flows in a regulated manner. 

Enhancing people-to-people contacts through cultural and medical tourism and an easier visa regime, besides ensuring exports of food such as onion and garlic (without which that nation’s palate is not complete) are not disrupted by seasonal bans, should also be part of the “good neighbour” doctrine.

An end to border killings, which occur as smugglers vie with each other over transport of humans, gold, narcotics and cattle, by changing the rules of engagement as well as renewing the Ganga water treaty of 1996 are obviously on the desired agenda. Success with Bangladesh could well set the tone for engagements with other neighbours.

Achilles' Heel

If Bangladesh is the bright spot in India’s neighbourhood diplomacy, the bleak spot remains the Maldives despite Muizzu appearing on stage with Modi during his swearing-in ceremony. 

The decidedly pro-China Mohammed Muizzo managed to win the Presidential elections after a second run-off against incumbent Ibrahim Mohammed Soli last year, in what was seen as a test for the Indian Ocean archipelago’s nascent democracy and its ties with China and traditional partner India.

Earlier this year, on the back of a demand that India withdraws the few dozen troops it had on the island nation, Muizzo’s party won the Parliamentary elections in a landslide victory.

India has been forced to come up with an olive branch despite many provocations, partly as many in the island remain pro-India (Maldivian leaders and ordinary citizens were the first to protest anti-India remarks by ruling party ministers) and partly because China’s engagement in India’s neighbourhood casts a long shadow, which New Delhi's policy makers remain wary about. 

India has also moved on in full realisation of both its own strength as also the geo-strategic position of the tiny group of islands. The critical sea lanes linking both South and East Asia to the Middle East pass by the Maldives. 

Both India and China have vied with each other for influence over the archipelago to be able to protect and control vital shipping including oil supplies to and from their respective countries. This need to protect commerce from disruptions of the kind resulting from attacks in the Red Sea has seen both the Asian rivals turn proactive in the area.

Containing China's Influence

In fact as China tries to build a ‘string of pearls’ -- an euphemism for a chain of strategic ports in Myanmar, Cambodia, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota, Pakistan’s Gwadar and in Djibouti -- and its belt and road initiative, India has responded by building rival bases in Iran’s Chabahar, Myanmar’s Sitwe and Mauritius’s Agalega. It is also building its own connectivity infrastructure to promote rail and road links with Kathmandu, Dhaka, Yangon and Colombo. 

The gains from improving connectivity and trade with other South Asian countries would of course not merely be strategic but also hugely beneficial for trading with neighbours. Intra-regional trade within the Europe stood at 68.4 per cent in 2023, at 30.6 per cent for North America and over 25 per cent for Asean.

In contrast, intra-regional trade within South Asia stands at just 6 per cent. And a mere 5.86 per cent of India’s mercantile exports is to South Asia of which 44 per cent igoes to Bangladesh, a nation India has partnered in a large way in building connectivity infrastructure. To address this deficit, India needs to continue with its policy of building connectivity infrastructure within the region.

The race between India and China to build a  railway link to Kathmandu is one that is both of geo-strategic importance as well as of great commercial importance for all, especially land-locked Nepal.

As India searches for its place in the sun and tries to take along its South Asian neighbours, New Delhi will have to consider how to face up to the dragon and also to live with it.

The second part of the story which focusses on great power rivarly and India can be read in the link given here.