West Needs India To Forge Global Cooperation On AI And Overcome The Great Wall Of China

One example of China’s disregard for the common charter of values was witnessed after its accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001. It agreed to abide by the rules set forth in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). The West saw China’s accession as a victory as it indicated that the previously closed economy was ready to open for business and play by free market economy rules. Former US President Bill Clinton noted that China’s accession suggested its openness to “one of democracy’s most cherished values, economic freedom,” and this would pave the way for political freedom in the country.

At the WTO, such notions of economic freedom translated into several value-based principles under the GATT. Key amongst these was the principle of non-discrimination articulated in part through the national treatment rule. National treatment dictates that a WTO member must accord the same treatment to foreign entities as it does to its own industries. As part of its accession agreement, China committed to revise its laws to conform with the national treatment rule.

However, China routinely deployed measures to discriminate against foreign companies. For instance, in a 2019 report for Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, the US trade representative indicated how China used value-added tax to disadvantage American producers of a fertilizer product known as diammonium phosphate that is exported from the US to China.

Conversely, the realm of data protection presents an example where Western jurisdictions like the EU introduced frameworks to enforce a common observance of values by trading partners, but failed to garner adherence from China. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation does not permit the export of the data of European citizens to jurisdictions that do not provide an “adequate” level of protection to data within their borders.

A key consideration for adequacy is limits to government surveillance and access to personal data. The adequacy condition prompted jurisdictions like the US, a country traditionally resistant to trammels in its surveillance regime, to introduce binding safeguards on US signals intelligence activities to enable the free flow of data between itself and the EU.

However, China’s National Intelligence Law 2017 requires its companies to supply intelligence agencies with information. Within its borders, China runs the internet like an intranet, a private national network under its hold. Its need to tightly control information means that it will never comply with GDPR adequacy requirements regarding government access to data.

India, for its part, may be wiser to these concerns, having been on the same side as China in several multilateral trade negotiations as “developing countries”. For example, China and India were on the same side of the fence when deliberating the development of trade rules for e-commerce at the WTO. Broadly, India (and most other developing nations) wanted the track on e-commerce to follow the 1998 Work Programme adopted by WTO members, which provided for separate working groups on e-commerce issues related to goods, services, and intellectual property.

India wanted the process to be carried out in a way where developing countries had greater choice and autonomy in governance decisions related to e-commerce. On the other side, the US, EU, and Japan began to push a more ambitious and cross-cutting e-commerce agenda as they accounted for the majority of cross-border e-commerce by the mid 2000s.

China initially supported India and the developing bloc’s position. However, in 2019, China switched over to the side of the developed nations, presumably because it now had large ecommerce majors itself, such as Alibaba.

The takeaway is this: Though China will readily sign on to soft laws and non-binding charters, it will not agree to binding norms. China has already outlined certain values it expects AI systems within its borders to follow. For instance, China’s law to tackle deepfakes requires such deep synthesis systems, AI models used to generate deep fakes, to be developed in accordance with socialist core values. It also prohibits such systems from being used for the subversion of State power.

If the West is indeed looking for wide-scale multilateral cooperation on issues surrounding AI, and this means including significant participation from developing nations, it must look to India. India has consistently championed the cause of developing nations in trade negotiations.

More importantly, India, like most of the developing and developed world, advocates for democracy. Illustratively, a 2019-2021 pan-Africa survey revealed that seven out of ten respondents preferred a democratically-elected government. Similarly, a 2021 poll of Latin American nations found that 61 per cent supported democracy.

In conclusion, while the Bletchley Declaration is a step towards global cooperation in managing AI’s emerging risks, its success largely hinges on the willingness of nations to align their own interests with collective safety and democratic values. Given the historical context of China’s selective adherence to international agreements, it is crucial for the developed world to forge alliances that can bridge the gap between ambition and reality. India’s track record of advocating for the interests of developing countries, and its alignment with democratic principles, positions it as a pivotal ally in such a quest.

(Meghna Bal is Head of Research at Esya Centre, a technology-policy focused think-tank. Views expressed are personal.)