Tue, May 26, 2026
As diplomatic efforts intensify under the Trump administration to end the long-drawn war in Ukraine, reports from ongoing negotiations suggest a framework that prioritises improved US-Russia relations while containing China. Though the details remain vague, the contours of potential talks appear to centre on some key tracks.
Firstly, it is to address the Russia-Ukraine bilateral issues. Russia’s core demand in the ongoing peace negotiations has been to keep Ukraine firmly within its sphere of influence. Central to this objective is Moscow’s insistence on the formal recognition of its territorial claims — specifically, sovereignty over Crimea, which was annexed in 2014, and the four regions annexed in 2022.
While Kiev has signalled a willingness to accept formal neutrality and forgo NATO membership, US-led negotiators have floated alternative security guarantees. These arrangements, described as “Article 5-like,” are intended to provide Ukraine with a credible deterrent to future Russian aggression without extending full NATO membership. The Russian language has long been a point of contention in Ukraine, where it is widely spoken, particularly in eastern and southern regions, but has faced increasing restrictions since 2014 amid efforts to promote Ukrainian as the state language. Russia has consistently demanded the recognition of Russian as an official state language. Russia also demands restoration, security guarantees, and official status for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which was banned in Ukraine.
A second track in the emerging framework focuses on normalising US-Russia relations, with proposals to gradually ease sanctions. Discussions have explored lifting targeted restrictions, particularly those affecting the energy, banking, and technology sectors, to enable the resumption of trade and investment. This could include a phased easing of measures on Russian oil and gas exports, aluminium supplies, and access to Western equipment for projects such as Arctic LNG developments.
Now comes the broader European security arrangements, which include restructuring regional spheres of influence, further easing sanctions, and exploring Russia's reintegration into high-level forums, such as a revived G8 format. These proposals seek to rebuild trust but risk reshaping Europe's security landscape in Russia's favour.
Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the EU has significantly reduced its dependence on Russian natural gas through the REPowerEU plan. Before the invasion, Russia supplied around 40%-45% of the EU's natural gas imports, primarily via pipelines such as Nord Stream and routes through Ukraine.
In 2025, Russia's share declined to approximately 13%-16% of the total imports, largely consisting of LNG. It has committed to a complete phase-out of Russian gas, leading to a full ban on LNG by early 2027 and pipeline gas by the autumn of 2027.
This plan enabled the US to emerge as the dominant LNG provider to Europe, accounting for around 57%-60% by mid-to-late 2025 amid increased volumes.
Norway remains the EU's leading overall supplier of gas, closely followed by Algeria (12%-19%), Qatar, Azerbaijan, and the UK.
Meanwhile, the US also seeks to gain the upper hand over China in the pursuit of rare earth elements and critical minerals, besides containing Russia’s deepening partnership with China.
Russian officials have emphasised a willingness to accommodate legitimate American interests, in contrast to perceptions of adversarial intent elsewhere. Vladimir Putin and Russian officials have frequently emphasised that Russia poses no threat to legitimate US interests, and is open to cooperation. Joint ventures in rare earth elements and critical minerals, both in Russia proper and in the occupied Ukrainian territories, are being considered as incentives for a comprehensive agreement. There are credible reports that most of the areas of Ukraine that contain rare earths and critical minerals have been occupied by Russia.
Joint Arctic Development is one of the key areas in which Russia and the US have complementary strengths. The US holds a significant advantage in the Arctic through advanced research, technology, alliances, and strategic positioning. Russia leads in icebreaking technology, shipping infrastructure, and operational experience along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) — a 5,600-km route that shortens shipping distances between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, as compared to southern routes such as the Suez Canal.
Such collaboration could reduce Russia’s reliance on China. Proposals for cooperation also highlight opportunities for partnerships in resource exploration, LNG projects, support for the US gas development in Alaska, and joint ventures in critical minerals to diversify global supply chains.
In such circumstances, Europe would likely be at a disadvantage. It has never fully reconciled itself to the rise of the Tsars after 1547, who placed themselves on par with Europe’s emperors, nor to Russia’s emergence as the centre of Eastern Christianity. Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire — the “First Rome” — in 476 AD, and the capture of Constantinople — the “Second Rome” — by the Ottomans in 1453, Russian Orthodox thinkers proclaimed Moscow the legitimate heir to Christian civilisation, as proclaimed in the doctrine of “Moscow, the Third Rome.” Europe compounded this historical unease by failing to make strategic adjustments to the emergence of the Soviet Union, a misreading, the consequences of which reverberate even today.
India stands to gain substantially from deeper engagement with Russia, beyond traditional defence and energy ties. It has substantial interests in rare earths, critical minerals, and Arctic development. Arctic collaboration is crucial as climate change in the Arctic directly shapes India’s monsoon behaviour, river systems and, by extension, the national food security. India would benefit from the advanced research and development initiatives on polar and climate science between Russia and the US.
India also brings tangible strength to such partnerships, notably in maritime logistics, as one of the world’s largest suppliers of seafarers. The India–Russia Memoranda of Understanding signed in December 2025, during Putin’s visit to New Delhi, to train Indian seafarers in polar and ice navigation at Russian institutions, could help unlock this latent potential. Cooperation with Russia on rare earths and critical minerals is essential for national security. Politically, any sustained weakening of Russia–China ties would further reinforce India’s strategic partnership with Moscow.
(The writer is an economist and former Ambassador. He is also the author of "India’s Energy Security and Economic Development: A Holistic Approach”, published by TERI. Views are personal.)