Fri, Jan 09, 2026
The US launched strikes on Venezuela. Then the military captured its President, Nicolás Maduro. Now the Trump administration has announced that the interim Venezuelan government will turn over up to 50 million barrels of sanctioned oil to the US. The Venezuelan episode reimposes the US's intervention policy, revoking the Monroe Doctrine. For India, this raises a broader and more consequential question: What does this action signal about the evolving rules of international conduct, and how should a major power in the Global South position itself in a world where the boundary between law and force is again being tested?
For much of the post-Cold War period, the use of direct military force to remove a sitting head of government had come to be viewed as an anachronism — messy, reputationally costly, and increasingly indefensible under international law. Economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and proxy pressure had replaced overt intervention as the preferred tools of coercion. That assumption was shattered on January 3, 2026, when the US conducted the unilateral military operation to detain and remove Nicolás Maduro from Caracas.
The US has defended its action in Venezuela through a familiar set of arguments — allegations of criminality, threats to regional stability, and the claim that exceptional circumstances justify exceptional measures. What distinguishes this episode is not the rhetoric, which has precedent, but the method. The direct physical removal of a sitting head of state without Security Council authorisation marks a qualitative escalation beyond sanctions or diplomatic pressure.
Under the UN Charter, the prohibition on the use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of states is not merely aspirational; it is foundational. Exceptions are narrow: self-defence against an armed attack or collective action authorised by the Security Council. Neither condition applied in the Venezuelan case. The absence of multilateral endorsement is, therefore, not a procedural oversight: it is the central legal deficiency of the operation.
For countries such as India, which have historically relied on the predictability of international laws to offset asymmetries of power, such precedents matter deeply. The erosion of restraints on unilateral action does not occur overnight; it advances incrementally, justified each time as unique. Venezuela now joins a short but consequential list of cases wherein force was used first, and legal rationalisation followed later.
The direct military operation was preceded by nearly two decades of escalating economic sanctions imposed by the US on Venezuela, particularly after the 2019 oil embargo, constraining not only the economy of the Latin American country, but also its energy sector. In practice, the sanctions functioned as a measure of indirect coercion, ultimately culminating in the use of brute force. In the case of Venezuela, sanctions prepared the ground for military escalation.
For India, which has itself navigated the complexities of secondary sanctions in other contexts, this sequence is instructive.
India’s interests in Venezuela are neither ideological nor symbolic; they are tangible. While bilateral trade volumes have declined sharply in recent years, Indian public-sector enterprises retain significant equity stakes in Venezuelan oil projects. ONGC Videsh Ltd’s participation in the San Cristóbal field and Indian involvement in the Carabobo blocks represent investments made under sovereign guarantees and long-term contractual frameworks.
A new government, particularly one aligned closely with Washington, may revisit the contracts signed under the previous government, not necessarily through outright expropriation, but via renegotiation, regulatory reinterpretation, or preferential treatment of domestic or allied firms.
Even if Indian assets are ultimately protected, the precedent is unsettling. It suggests that political outcomes enforced through military power can retroactively alter the commercial and legal environment in which foreign investments operate. For a country with growing overseas economic exposure, this is a strategic vulnerability India cannot ignore.
The Venezuelan episode calls for a calibrated response that combines principle with pragmatism. Firstly, India should consistently reaffirm the centrality of the UN Charter and the inadmissibility of unilateral regime change.
Secondly, it must treat energy security as a core strategic concern, not merely economic. India should also invest in deeper coordination with other Global South countries on norms and responses. This does not require military alignment or ideological blocs, shared red lines and the willingness to articulate them collectively.
Finally, India needs to recognise that the international system is entering a phase in which power is once again exercised more openly. In such an environment, credibility matters. A state that seeks protection from rules must also be seen as willing to defend them.
Venezuela’s importance extends far beyond its national borders. With the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, its re-entry into global markets at scale would have significant implications for energy prices, supply chains, and currency flows. A US-supervised stabilisation of Venezuelan production could push output well beyond current levels, benefiting refiners configured for heavy crude, primarily in North America.
For India, the implications are mixed. Lower global prices would ease the burden of imports, which constitute a significant share of India’s trade deficit. At the same time, preferential allocation of Venezuelan crude to US refiners could tighten supply in Asian markets, driving up regional premiums. Indian refineries, many of which are optimised for heavy crude, could face higher costs or supply disruptions despite overall price moderation.
Moreover, Venezuela’s previous efforts to transact oil in non-dollar currencies were a direct challenge to the leverage derived from dollar dominance in energy trade. Its potential reversal under US influence would reinforce the existing currency order, with implications for sanctions enforcement and financial autonomy across the Global South.
The reactions of BRICS countries to the Venezuelan intervention revealed both convergence and constraint. Russia and China issued strong condemnations, framing the action as a violation of sovereignty and international law. Brazil and South Africa echoed concerns about precedent and legality, albeit in more measured terms.
India’s response was characteristically cautious, emphasising stability, dialogue, and restraint.
The events in Venezuela are unlikely to be reversed, and their immediate outcomes will unfold irrespective of India’s position. But its precedents have long-term consequences, shaping expectations and redefining what is considered permissible.
For India, the question is not whether it can prevent such actions, but whether it can help shape the environment in which they are judged. Sovereignty, once diluted, is rarely restored by appeals alone. It survives through consistent defence, strategic cooperation, and the quiet accumulation of credibility.
The choice before India is not dramatic, but decisive, and that is to read the Venezuelan episode as a signal — and respond accordingly.
(The writer is a former diplomat who has served as High Commissioner to Canada and Ambassador to Japan & Sudan. Views are personal.)