Back in 1974, India didn’t budge in the face of nuclear hypocrisy and monopoly and US pressure. 

On May 18 that year, the “Buddha Smiled”. India became the sixth nuclear power in the world outside the exclusive club of the UNSC’s five permanent members (P5). 

Operation Smiling Buddha (Pokhran-I), a “peaceful nuclear explosion”, used an implosion-type fission device with a 6 kg plutonium core yielding 8-10 kilotons (kt). 

Despite lacking a nuclear triad, India’s capability to build and test an N-bomb caught the US off guard.

Exactly 24 years later, India flexed its nuclear muscles again.  

Series Of Underground Nuclear Tests

Under Operation Shakti (Pokhran-II), India conducted a series of five underground nuclear tests in May 1998.

The first three simultaneous tests were conducted on 11 May. 

Shakti I was a two-stage thermonuclear fusion device with a 45 kt yield. Shakti II was a light-weight plutonium implosion fission device with a yield of 12 kt. Shakti III was an experimental linear implosion fission device that used reactor-grade plutonium with a 0.3 kt yield. 

The other two tests were conducted on May 13. 

Shakti IV was an experimental fission device with a 0.5 kt yield. Shakti V was a thorium/U-233 experimental fission device with a 0.2 kt yield. 

By that time, India had the nuclear-capable Prithvi-I SRBM and the SEPECAT Jaguar and Mirage 2000—the two legs of the nuclear triad. By 2016, India completed its N-triad following the commissioning of INS Arihant, the first submersible ship ballistic nuclear.

Nuclear Haves And Have-Nots

Before India’s 1974 nuclear test, the P5 had cleverly monopolised nuclear weapons and testing. 

Every nuclear treaty was an attempt to divide the world into nuclear haves and have-nots. 

In 1963, the US, the UK, and the erstwhile USSR signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which allowed underground tests. France and China didn’t sign the treaty.

In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into effect to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and N-technology and further the goal of disarmament. 

According to Article IX, a country that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967 was a nuclear-weapon state (NWS).

The US had tested a nuclear device in 1945, the USSR in 1949, the UK in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964.

It was a clever tactic to prohibit non-nuclear nations from acquiring nukes. 

Article I barred an NWS from transferring nukes or assisting a non-NWS in manufacturing or acquiring such weapons.

Article II barred a non-NWS party from receiving nukes from any source, manufacturing them and receiving assistance in their manufacture. 

Notably, the NPT didn’t ban nuclear weapon testing, which was against Article VI, calling for nuclear disarmament and ending the arms race.

In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed. However, it couldn’t come into force because 44 nations didn’t ratify it. 

The treaty, which banned only nuclear testing for both military and civilian purposes, was again discriminatory as it ensured that nuclear powers maintain their arsenals with no commitment to disarmament. 

How India Challenged Nuclear Monopoly

The US policy has been to stockpile nuclear warheads but not allow other nations, especially those that are militarily inferior, to have nukes. 

Several nations pursued nukes but either dismantled or discontinued their programmes under US pressure: South Africa, Iraq, Libya, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Argentina, and Brazil. 

But not India. It became a nuclear power without violating the conditions in the treaties it had signed.

For example, India, which signed the PTBT along with several other nations, didn’t violate it as both Pokhran I and II were underground tests.  

On the other hand, India, along with Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan, never signed the NPT, which has 191 members.

India found the NPT discriminatory as it maintained the nuclear imbalance with the P5 possessing nukes and other nations only conventional weapons.

During a debate on the NPT in the Lok Sabha on April 5, 1968, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rightly said: “India’s refusal to sign the NPT was based on enlightened self-interest and the considerations of national security.” 

While nuclear powers would continue to manufacture more nukes, she said, others are “called upon to undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons for their own defence”. She stressed that the NPT discrimination could only be eliminated through nuclear disarmament. 

Similarly, the lack of commitment to time-bound disarmament was the reason India didn’t sign the CTBT. 

By the time the CTBT was signed, the P5 had conducted more than 2,000 nuclear tests — the US 1,032 tests (1945-1992); the Soviet Union 715 (1949-1990); the UK 45 (1952-1991); France 210 (1960-1996) and China 45 tests (1964-1996).

The Big Five had already conducted enough nuclear tests and didn’t need further testing.

India had conducted only one test (1974).

On May 27, 1998, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee also mentioned nuclear imbalance during a Lok Sabha debate following the global furore about Pokhran-II. 

“In the absence of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament, we cannot accept a regime that creates an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and have-nots,” he said. 

Vajpayee also highlighted the inherent discrimination in the NPT and the CTBT.

In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India had suggested an international non-proliferation agreement under which nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals, provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons, he said. 

However, “this balance of rights and obligations was absent” in the NPT, he said. 

Regarding India not signing the CTBT, he said, “Our perception then was that subscribing to the CTBT would severely limit India’s nuclear potential at an unacceptably low level.” He also mentioned how the treaty didn’t “carry forward the nuclear disarmament process”. 

Massive N-Stockpile Proves India Right

Both Indira Gandhi and Vajpayee were right about the NPT’s failure to achieve disarmament.  

The lack of nuclear disarmament is reflected in the massive difference in stockpiles of the P5 and the other four nuclear powers, including India.  

According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2025, the total global inventory of estimated N-warheads in January last year was 12,241. 

Of the total stockpile, 9,614 were for potential use with an estimated 3,912 deployed on missiles and aircraft. Around 2,100 of the deployed warheads were on high operational alert on ballistic missiles. Almost all these warheads belonged to Russia or the US, which together possess around 90% of all nuclear weapons. 

Russia had 4,309 warheads (deployed plus stored), the US 3,700, China 600, France 290 and the UK 225.

On the other hand, India had 180 warheads, Pakistan 170, Israel 90 and North Korea 50.

India’s N-Deterrence And Western Pressure

India had its reasons to conduct the nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998.

India and China had fought in 1962. Two years later, China became a nuclear power —and by 1974, it had already conducted around 15-17 tests. 

India urgently needed nuclear deterrence not only against China but also against Pakistan, with which it had fought in 1971.

The Western reaction was on expected lines.

After Pokhran-I, Canada, which had helped India build the Canada-India Reactor Utility Services (CIRUS), halted shipments of nuclear equipment and materials and cut technological exchanges. India had used plutonium derived from the CIRUS reactor.

The US halted the supply of low-enriched uranium fuel to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes doesn’t lead to the proliferation of nukes.

Pokhran-II was prompted by the US turning a blind eye to Pakistan’s possession of nukes and the NPT’s indefinite extension. 

US Sanctions On India

The US immediately slapped sanctions on India under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (Glenn Amendment). 

Assistance under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act was terminated (except for humanitarian assistance for food or other agricultural commodities), no sales of defence articles and services, no licenses for the export of munitions, no foreign military financing, no financial assistance and opposition to loans by any international financial institution.

India withstood the immense American pressure and emerged as the winner due to its independent foreign policy, doggedness and diplomacy.  

In 2008, history was created when the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement was signed, making India the first country to have nuclear trade with the NSG despite retaining its nuclear weapons programme. 

India had become a nuclear power—unambiguously and unapologetically. 

(The writer is a columnist with more than two decades of experience in journalism. Views expressed are personal.)