Now, the first batch of satellites will be launched this year instead of 2027-28.

India needs a dedicated, offensive—not defensive—space force or command that should deter enemies from targeting its satellites. The real game is to capture or destroy the enemy satellite before it makes a dangerous move without needing an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. 

Satellite Dogfights

In February 2022, something extraordinary happened 35,776 km above Earth—an incident that neither the US nor China acknowledged.

An American spy satellite, USA 270, spotted two Chinese, apparently experimental, spacecraft, Shiyan 12-01 and 12-02, and approached them from behind, with the Sun at its back. 

The next day, the Chinese satellites split apart as USA 270 zipped past with Shiyan 12-02 manoeuvring behind the American satellite. In the next few days, both Chinese satellites outmanoeuvred USA 270 and Shiyan 12-01 manoeuvred behind the US satellite once. 

Something similar happened in 2024 too.

“They [Chinese] are practising tactics, techniques and procedures to do on-orbit space operations from one satellite to another,” General Michael Guetlein, the then Vice-Chief of US Space Force, said in March last year referring to three Shiyan-24C experimental satellites dogfighting with two Shijian-6 05A/B in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in 2024. 

Space As Fourth Domain Of Warfare 

In total, India operates 136 satellites. Starting with Aryabhata in 1975, the space saga has continued with Chandrayaan-1 in 2008 to Mangalyaan-1 in 2013 to Chandrayaan-3 in 2023.

India launched the SBS project in 2001, aiming to put a constellation of satellites for the armed forces, realising the importance of exclusive use of satellite imagery for the military after the Kargil War. 

However, India has only nine such satellites, of which only GSAT 7R (2025, Navy) and GSAT 7A (2018, Air Force) are exclusively for military communication. GSAT 7B, a third military communication satellite, will be launched for the Army. The rest are dual-use satellites.

In general, space as the fourth domain of warfare originated from the Space Race between the former Soviet Union and the US, which began in the 1950s.

The launch of Sputnik 1, using a modified R-7 Semyorka, the world’s first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), on October 4, 1957, alarmed the US, which feared that the Soviets could use satellites to deploy ICBMs or nukes in space.

The US even considered exploding an atomic bomb on the Moon in the 1950s. 

Three years later, the US initiated Project BAMBI (Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept), a network of 500 satellites that would launch interceptors to destroy an ICBM in its boost phase. However, the project was shelved due to the lack of necessary technology and the enormous $50 billion cost.

In 1983, Ronald Reagan proposed a space-based system against strategic nukes called the Strategic Defense Initiative, nicknamed “Star Wars”. In 1985, the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established. 

Meanwhile, the Soviets developed the R-36ORB Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, which could deliver a warhead using a low earth orbit (LEO). However, the 1979 SALT II prohibited its deployment. The Soviets also designed the Polyus orbital weapons platform.

The first use of space as the fourth domain of warfare was in Operation Desert Storm (1990-91) against Iraq with USSPACECOM proving to be very valuable for the US-led coalition. The use of the NAVSTAR GPS constellation of 16 satellites helped American troops navigate, communicate and guide weapons across the desert’s vast expanse.

In total, 60 satellites provided GPS navigation, communications, intelligence, missile warnings, weather updates and data for precision attacks. 

China Wakes Up, Transforms

China launched its first exclusive military reconnaissance (photographic surveillance) satellite, Fanhui Shi Weixing-0, in 1975. 

However, Desert Storm jolted China, triggering the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) transformation and modernisation in the next three decades by incorporating the space and cyber domains.

Three years later, China was again shocked when the US turned off its GPS over the waters of Taiwan during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, causing two Chinese missiles to lose track. 

The humiliation prompted China to launch the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) four years later.

President Xi Jinping radically revised the military doctrine to win ‘Informatised Local Wars’ in an “information-based systems-of-systems” in 2015. He formed the PLA Aerospace Force, the only independent aerospace force after the US Aerospace Force, in 2024. 

After the First Gulf War, China launched several dual-use and exclusive military satellites (communications, reconnaissance and early warning)—Shentong Series, 2003; Yaogan Series, 2006; Tianlian Series, 2008; Gaofen Series, 2013; Jilin Series, 2015; Hongyan Series, 2018; and Fen Yung Series, 2025. 

Since the end of 2015, China’s on-orbit presence has grown by around 667%. As of November 2025, China had 1,300-plus satellites with 70 launches placing 319 payloads into orbit last year alone—of these, 490 are military satellites. 

India Should Look Beyond ASAT Weapons

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in orbit. However, the treaty doesn’t ban all conventional weapons from being deployed in space. 

The Americans and Soviets tested ASAT weapons before and after the Treaty. 

In 1959, the US fired its first ASAT weapon, Bold Orion, an air-launched ballistic missile aimed at the Explorer VI satellite but missed the target. 

In 1963–1964, the Soviet Union tested prototypes of Polyot-1 and Polyot-2 ASAT missiles.

China became the third nation to test an ASAT weapon in 2007 when an FY-1C weather satellite was destroyed by an SC-19 anti-ballistic missile based on the DF-21 MRBM.

In 2019, India became the fourth member of the ASAT club by launching the anti-ballistic missile interceptor Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark-II to shoot down the experimental imaging satellite Microsat-R in LEO under Mission Shakti. 

ASAT weapons are kinetic-kill vehicles. China has also developed laser-based and directed-energy weapons (DEWs).

However, the actual competition is beyond ASAT weapons—and India needs to catch up fast with China racing ahead.

ASAT weapons, especially kinetic-kill vehicles, have two major limitations. 

Firstly, they can be intercepted with missiles, defensive satellites orbiting target satellites, DEWs, electronic warfare and cyberattacks. 

Secondly, ASAT weapons have a range limit. For example, India’s ASAT missile can hit targets moving at 10 km/s at an altitude of 1,200 km, as per the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). However, China’s high-resolution remote sensing satellite Yaogan-41 in the Geostationary Orbit, around 36,000 km above Earth, is beyond the reach of any missile. 

India Needs Capturing, Grappling Satellites

China realised the ASAT weapons’ limitations years ago and transformed accordingly to achieve an upper hand against the US.

USA 270, operating at an altitude beyond the reach of any ICBM, was launched in 2016. Around five years later, China launched the Shiyan 12-01 and 12-02 to outmanoeuvre US satellites.

The Shiyan Series is highly classified. Shiyan 7 (2013) has a robotic arm that performed rendezvous proximity operations (RPO)—manoeuvres to dock onto, inspect or grapple with the target satellite—with its companion payloads, Shijian 15 and Chuangxin 3.

Similarly, the “dual use” Shijian Series comprises some satellites that deploy subsatellites and perform RPOS. The Shijian-17 is the first Chinese satellite with a robotic arm. A month before the February 2022 dogfighting, Shijian-21 pulled a dead BDS satellite out of its geosynchronous orbit and placed it several hundred kilometres away.

An attack on India’s satellites would have a massive military and civilian impact. The armed forces would be at a loss without real-time surveillance, intelligence and imagery.  Missiles would be useless without communication. Internet, TV broadcasting, transport, navigation and banking and financial services would come to a halt.  

The only option to prevent the enemy from destroying Indian space assets is 24x7 surveillance of enemy satellites and capture/destroy them before the war begins.  

China, which has always been a bigger threat to India than Pakistan, has already made rapid strides in spying against and outmanoeuvring satellites and grappling/capturing them in space.  

In mid-2024, a Chinese satellite came within 1 km of an Indian satellite 500-600 km above Earth in a possible show of strength, Bloomberg reported.

Last year, the government decided to launch ‘bodyguard satellites’ to escort, protect and counter such satellites. Now, talks with startups to launch such satellites this year are in an advanced stage, according to Bloomberg. More launches are expected by year-end or early next year. Subsequently, the government will acquire the technology and develop more such satellites. 

The problem is that India decided to act only after the 2024 incident. China’s dogfight with the US satellite or grappling with its own satellites in 2022 should have alarmed India. 

The Defence Space Agency, an integrated tri-services agency formed in 2019 to focus on space warfare and satellite intelligence, is primarily focused on defence and deterrence, not offence. 

ISRO and DRDO already have a rich experience in designing and building military satellites. The next step is to design and manufacture satellites that can trail, outmanoeuvre, grapple and capture enemy satellites. 

(The writer is a columnist with more than two decades of experience in journalism. Views expressed are personal.)