India's Third Way: Bringing Security Into Play In Building Indo-ASEAN Alliance

The idea is to turn occasional teamwork into real, on-the-ground coordination. Indian Navy ships will host ASEAN fleets in the Bay of Bengal, and in return, Indian warships will stop at Southeast Asian ports, stretching India’s reach right into the South China Sea.

For once, India wants to bank on its position as one of Asia’s pre-eminent naval powers to take on the increasing influence of Chinese and other naval fleets in the region.

If this all sounds a bit like a “Quad 2.0,” that’s no accident. Working more closely with ASEAN lets India build a loose coalition—one that backs a “free and open Indo-Pacific” but doesn’t force smaller countries to pick sides against China.

Still, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s main focus has remained business. India is pushing hard for a big update to the ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA).

Right now, old tariffs, extra red tape, and uneven food safety rules are holding back what could be a massive market—over two billion people. The trade deals with Asean countries have meant an expansion of trade, but more favouring the Southeast Asian nations, while Indian exports have languished.

“The goal is to make the deal more even, more modern, and a lot more digital, with new rules for e-commerce, easier standards, and better online systems for small businesses,” said senior Commerce Ministry officials.

A New Approach

For ASEAN, the draw is pretty simple. With China slowing down and supply chains shifting, India offers a huge market and a backup plan if Beijing gets too dominant. For India, stronger trade with ASEAN gives its big strategic ambitions some real-world weight—especially since skipping the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in the last decade left it on the outside of Asia’s main trade club.

India’s pitch to ASEAN is a bit of a paradox. It wants to team up on strategy, but not get tied down by formal alliances. Modi called India and ASEAN “fellow travellers of the Global South”—basically, a third way, not just picking sides in the US-China rivalry. The message was clear: India is offering a "third way", which does create a confrontational alliance. 

As China pushes harder in the South China Sea and the US ramps up its military presence through deals like AUKUS, India is stepping up as a stabilising force. “It wants to remain connected to the region by history and culture, open for business, but determined to stay independent. India’s navy is key to this,” said Pinka R Chakravarty, former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, just a few hundred nautical miles from the Strait of Malacca, have quietly become the heart of its Indo-Pacific plans. The islands now host joint exercises with ASEAN navies and are being built up as a logistics and shipping hub.

The new Great Nicobar Port is set to handle some of the region’s biggest ships, offering an alternative to Singapore for trade and a strategic outpost for maritime surveillance.

It’s both a business opportunity and a security move, two for the price of one.

China Looms Large

Of course, China isn’t just watching from the sidelines. It’s ASEAN’s biggest trading partner and a growing maritime power. India’s careful approach is about more than just self-interest; it’s about giving ASEAN countries real choices.

The new maritime cooperation, with plans to combat piracy, assist in disasters, and develop blue economy projects, enables India to expand its influence under the banner of “collective security,” rather than confrontation.

Still, the real message isn’t hard to spot. India’s push for stronger maritime ties, its talk about stable supply chains, and its alignment with the US on Indo-Pacific rules all add up to a quiet pushback against China’s rise, even though Indian policy makers are keen to emphasise that they don’t “want an open fight”.

There’s more to this story than just deals and strategy. India’s ties to Southeast Asia or India-China have been historical. There have been millennia of shared history, religious, cultural, and linguistic ties. Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sanskrit have all left their mark and transported India into the Far East.

Today, Indian diplomacy still leans on that history. We see it in the scholarships for ASEAN students, the shared Ramayana legend, Songkran festivals, and the temple restorations. These gestures don’t make headlines, but they build trust, quietly, bit by bit.

Then there’s the Indian diaspora—successful, visible, and politically active in places like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. They add another layer to India’s influence, mixing soft power with real strategic weight.

Take Modi’s recent speech and India’s push towards maritime cooperation. Put them together, and you start to see India’s new approach in Asia. It’s practical, flexible, and confident, but in a subtle way.

India’s not just playing middleman between East and West anymore. It wants to stand on its own as a third force, helping shape how the Indo-Pacific does business and keeps the peace.

However, speeches only go so far. What really counts is what happens next—can India turn big talk into real, lasting partnerships?

Can it go from symbolic gestures to something solid and ongoing? For ASEAN countries, India’s appeal is its size and strength, but also the fact that it doesn’t throw its weight around.

For India, ASEAN is both a market and a stage—a place to show it can look east, trade smart, and hold its own between China and the US.

(The writer is a senior journalist. Views are personal.)