Estimates of Iran’s missile stockpile before the war varied from 3,000-2,500 (Israeli military) to around 6,000 (independent analysts). 

So far, the US and Israel have struck more than 21,000 Iranian military targets with Israel claiming to have “neutralised” 335, or 70%, of Iran’s missile launchers. 

Last month, however, the US intelligence estimated that only 33% of Iran’s missile and drone arsenal was destroyed, according to Reuters. Now, the latest US intelligence estimate says 50% of Iran’s launchers and drones (in thousands) are intact, per CNN.

A resilient Iran continues to launch salvos of missiles and drones—though in small numbers.

According to data compiled by Ankara-based Anadolu Agency from the Gulf nations hit by Iran, the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies and open-source intelligence platforms, Iran has launched more than 6,770 missiles and drones since February 28. 

The war has highlighted how asymmetric warfare using missiles and drones would play a significant role in future wars with a militarily inferior nation taking on a superpower.   

Iran’s Underground Missile Cities 

Two conclusions can be drawn from Iran’s continuing missile strikes.

Firstly, estimating Iran’s missile stockpile is impossible. A US official familiar with intelligence reports told Reuters that it was impossible to have an accurate number.

“Do not bother trying to count our missiles, drones and strategic systems. You will be wrong and achieve nothing,” Ebrahim Zolfaghari, spokesperson for Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, hit back after Trump said that Iran will be bombed back to the “Stone Ages”. 

Secondly, Iranian missiles are stored in the IRGC’s impregnable underground bases called “Missile Cities”, which can’t be destroyed even by the most powerful US bunker buster bombs, especially the GBU-57, or the Massive Ordnance Penetrator. 

Iran began constructing Missile Cities way back in the late ’80s. Years of meticulous planning and strategy are the reason for Iran’s missile and drone stockpiles surviving despite numerous US-Israeli bombings.   

The bases, hidden 50-500 metres beneath mountains, are used to assemble missiles, store and fire them from silos. The missiles are mobile and combat-ready via a sophisticated rail network. 

Every base has several entrances and exits—some decoys, others camouflaged and the remaining real. Bunker busters can only collapse entrances and exits, which are repaired within 48 hours of airstrikes, with missiles operational. 

A CNN investigation of 27 Missile Cities and 107 tunnels using satellite imagery confirmed that 77% of tunnel entrances were damaged. But Iranians started using excavators to access the buried munitions in less than 48 hours. 

Similarly, according to Alma Research and Education Center, a nonprofit Israeli security research group, underground missile bases in Hormozgan, Isfahan, Khorramabad and Tabriz were all hit last month—but the damage was only above the ground.

Moreover, the number of Missile Cities, like Iran’s missiles, is unknown. In April 2025, Amirali Hajizadeh, Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, killed in an Israeli airstrike during Operation Rising Lion in June, had said that Iran has hundreds of Missile Cities. 

India’s Ballistic Missiles, Launchers  

India has come a long way in developing ballistic missiles, including an ICBM—the Agni series, the Prithvi series (III is the Dhanush SLBM), the Prahar and the K-4 and K-15 (SLBMs).

Land-based ballistic missiles can be launched from transporter erector launchers and, in some cases, also from rail-based mobile launchers, like Agni-II (MRBM), Agni-III (IRBM) and Agni-Prime (MRBM), suiting the country’s mountainous terrain. 

Rail-mounted missiles are stored in two places, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Agni IIs in Dehu (Pune), Maharashtra, can target Pakistan and Agni-IIIs in Missa (Nagaon), Assam, can target China.

Mobile canisters, especially rail-based, offer rapid deployment, dispersal, reduced visibility, ambiguity and survival in case of an attack. 

However, canisters can be detected by reconnaissance drones, advanced space radars and signals intelligence. Moreover, missiles produce a significant heat signature, allowing enemy missiles or warplanes to strike canisters.  

Iran’s Missile Cities Lesson For India 

India’s Ballistic Missile Defence consists of the Prithvi Air Defence missile for high-altitude interception (50-80 km) and the Advanced Air Defence for low-level interception (30 m). 

However, if the enemy hits the canister, it not only prevents the launch but also destroys the missiles or renders them useless. In a war, like the ongoing conflict against Iran, the enemy could also target missile production sites.  

So, What’s The Solution? 

Iran-like Missile Cities in the mountains (Karakoram, Zanskar, Pir Panjal and Ladakh) and silos on small, remote islands of Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep. India is already considering constructing silos on islands. 

For India, the Imam Hussein Base, in the Shirkuh granite batholith of Yazd Province, is the ideal Missile City.

Strategically carved around 500 metres below, the heavily fortified base has been bombed twice in the war with only on-surface damage as granite is one of the hardest rocks. 

The four-tier base is a structural and strategic marvel, based on which India should construct its Missile Cities. 

Tier 1 has decoy entrances and exits and radar deception systems to deceive the enemy.

Tier 2 has fuel storage and the assembly workshop. 

Tier 3 has personnel dormitories and fully automated industrial kitchens.

Tier 4 contains the missiles and vertical launch silos. The key is to protect missile reserves against airstrikes.

Like missile storage, command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) is located in the deepest part of the mountain to ensure the survival of the stockpile and the control systems.  

The base is connected to a central AI system to ensure automated decisions if communication is lost. India, like Iran, can also counter electromagnetic warfare against command-and-control centres of its Missile Cities by using Faraday cages (made of copper, aluminium or steel), which block electromagnetic radiation. 

India Has Several Advantages

India can easily adopt the Iranian concept of Missile Cities as it has several advantages.

India has expertise in tunnel boring machine technology in the Himalayas—Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee Tunnel, Atal Tunnel and the upcoming Zojila Tunnel. It can reverse-engineer deep tunnelling technology for military use.

India has vast experience in laying railway tracks. Iranian Missile Cities have kilometres of rail tracks enabling rapid transportation of missiles from storage to silos. If the enemy identifies one silo, missiles are immediately relocated to another. The bases are also interconnected via an extensive underground rail network.  

India has sufficient granite and quartz, two of the hardest rocks. The granite mountains are in the South (Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Telangana and Andhra), the Trans-Himalayan Ladakh and Karakoram. Similarly, quartz is also found in the South. 

The Yazd base’s entrances and exits are camouflaged and covered with movable artificial boulders. Iran also covers them with concrete and soil so that they blend into the ground. Besides, decoy launchers are also used to deceive the attacker. 

India used Bofors gun decoys to deceive the Pakistani Army in 1999. During Operation Sindoor, the IAF used the Rafale’s advanced X-Guard decoy system to mimic the radar signature of actual fighter jets. Last year, the Army invited responses from public and private companies to its request for information for fake T-90 main battle tanks. 

Underground Great Wall of China 

China, like Iran, began working on concealing its nuclear ballistic missiles and a massive launch base in the ’80s. 

Spanning 5,000 km, the “Underground Great Wall of China” is a labyrinthine tunnel network hundreds of metres beneath the mountainous Hebei province. 

The network, which has rail tracks and roads to transport missiles, can’t be detected from space and can withstand nuclear or conventional attacks. 

The network, China’s second-strike capability, is an underground-based version of a Submersible Ship Ballistic Missile Nuclear (SSBN), according to Hui Zhang, a senior research associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. 

These “tunnel-launched ballistic missiles or TLBM”, as he calls them, comprise DF-11 and DF-15 (SRBMs), DF-17 (an MRBM equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle), DF-21 (MRBM), DF-26 (IRBM) and DF-31, DF-4, DF-5, DF-41 and DF-61 (ICBMs)—all nuclear capable.

According to a 2011 Georgetown University study, the network can store 3,000 nuclear warheads.

(Aninda Dey is a columnist with more than two decades of experience in journalism. Views are personal.)