How Do You Solve A Problem Like Trump?

One can never really guess what was on Trump's mind when he seemingly favoured Pakistan. However, the fact remains that after US President Donald Trump gave a “royal audience” to Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir — who is accused by New Delhi of implicit involvement in the Pahalgam terror attack — India's policymakers must be racking their brains to work out how to solve “a problem like Trump”. 

On the one hand, it is patently evident that the US needs India as a key partner in its Asia-Pacific plans, which include both strategically curbing China’s power play in the region and veering global supply chains away from Beijing’s control through “friend shoring”.

On the other hand, instead of elevating Indo-US strategic relations under a Republican presidency in the US as was expected, factors such as desperate bids by Munir (who wants to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize), and flattering gifts and concessions to cronies by neighbouring countries, continue to cloud India’s bonhomie with the most powerful nation in the world.

Answer To Trump’s Puzzle

The answer to the puzzle lies in both President Trump’s conduct and India’s lack of strategic clarity, as seen by the world. Trump's strategy for solving the world's problems, as well as the US's economic and diplomatic relations, has been all about transactional relationships.

‘Gifts', which include a luxury jet from Qatar and fast-tracking of clearances for a sprawling golf resort in Vietnam, are among the sweeteners that have been used to strike deals with him. Munir is believed to have offered the US part of Pakistan’s critical mineral reserves, which, according to some estimates, could be worth up to US$ 1 trillion.

To India’s east, Bangladesh is offering the US a supply corridor to the Rakhine province in Myanmar, which could help the rebel Arakan army take on the pro-China junta ruling in Myanmar — a strategic interest area for the US, given that rebel-controlled areas of the Southeast Asian nation has 11 per cent of the world’s rare earth resources.

What Can India Offer?

What India can offer is its ability to straddle both worlds — its excellent relations with all three major actors, Iran, the US, and Israel, and thus its ability to be an acceptable, honest broker. The US may wish for a regime change in Iran, but that is unlikely to happen, as the Iranian population seems to have gathered together to back the current dispensation against the massive strikes that the Israelis and Americans have unleashed on the country.

War cannot be a constant, and both sides would realise the cost of a prolonged war would be too heavy for their economies and the global economy, given that the region accounts for 30 per cent of the world's oil shipments. That is indeed where India can make its mark and win not only the trust of the three principal actors but of the world at large. 

However, there are many other smaller but more practical issues that India must take up to solve the Trump puzzle. A quick resolution to India’s trade disputes, culminating in an FTA with the US, is a must if relations are to progress. Dragging the feet on trade conflicts which may not amount to a great concession, just to save face when the rest of the world is scrambling to strike a deal, makes no sense, unless India has some bargaining ace up its sleeve as China had in the form of controlling some 70 per cent of the world’s rare earth supplies.

Intelligence sharing in the global war against terrorism, as well as covert assistance to the US in its attempts to organise military supply chains in Asia for future wars and insurrections, could be thought of and granted without compromising India’s sovereignty or strategic friendships in the region.

India can also offer the use of Indian ports to US naval ships transiting through the Indian Ocean on patrol duties for repair and maintenance, as well as on ports of call, without establishing any permanent bases, giving Washington a cause to be beholden to India.

After all, India’s very geographic location gives it an overarching strategic oversight and control over the entire Indian Ocean, from the Strait of Malacca to the Red Sea.

Offers to jointly exploit the mineral wealth under the Indian Ocean, where India has long been locked in a geo-exploration race with China, should also be of keen interest to Washington, given its desire to stop China from controlling the critical resources needed to fuel future green technology-led developments.

Strategic Clarity At Stake

India also has to understand that its exclusion from several high tables — G7 is just one of them — was less a calculated policy shift than a reflection of Washington’s enduring ambivalence about India’s global orientation — its perceived lack of strategic clarity, its reluctance to fully align with the West, and its ongoing effort to straddle competing geopolitical frameworks.

Since the end of the Cold War, India has cultivated relationships with both Western powers and non-Western groupings, seeking simultaneously to integrate into global markets while maintaining sovereignty over its foreign policy choices.

In recent years, New Delhi has drawn closer to Washington through foundational defence agreements, intelligence cooperation, and shared technological frameworks. The Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) have positioned India as a key player in countering China’s rise.

Yet, India’s embrace of multilateralism has always been tempered by caution. It continues to pursue economic protectionism, resists formal alliances, and remains a core member of BRICS — a grouping often seen in the West as an anti-hegemonic coalition led by China and Russia.

Within this strategic posture lies a contradiction: While India seeks to be recognised as a major power, its reluctance to commit to any single bloc often leads to exclusion from the very decision-making circles it aspires to join.

Paradox Facing India 

For India, BRICS remains both a platform and a paradox. It allows New Delhi to assert its Global South credentials and pursue multipolarity, yet it binds it to a coalition increasingly shaped by Beijing’s ambitions and Moscow’s revisionism.

The group’s 2023 expansion to include energy-rich and geopolitically assertive states such as Iran and the UAE reflects growing momentum. But India’s influence within BRICS is also strained by its border disputes with China, Beijing’s control over institutions like the BRICS New Development Bank, and by fundamental differences over global governance.

India has long argued that institutions such as the UN Security Council and the G7 do not reflect contemporary power realities. Yet, its calls for reform have rarely been matched by structural initiatives. Without more decisive leadership within multilateral platforms, India risks being caught between competing coalitions, none of which fully align with its long-term interests.

At some stage, India has to make clear its choice. Either it is part of the Western alliance, or it has to decide that it will retain its strategic independence, but with a bias towards the West, without which, its potential allies in Washington, Paris, and London will continue to look at it with suspicion.

A clear statement will not end its relations with either Moscow or Beijing, both of whom need New Delhi as much as India needs them.

However, an ambivalent attitude towards the two power poles may see India “friendless”, in a world increasingly hurtling towards a new era of “hot wars” fought by shifting actors and alliances.

The time has come for New Delhi to choose, and choose wisely.