Thu, Aug 28, 2025
After the ‘bromance’ between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald Trump, all eyes will be on the slated meeting between the Indian leader and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, towards the end of this month.
Not only does the meeting come on the heels of the US President slapping a punishing tariff on Indian exports to the US, but it’s also viewed as the most consequential India-China meeting since the bloody hand-to-hand combat in Galwan in June 2020 froze bilateral ties and set off five years of mistrust.
India's Eastwards Pivot
Officially, the meeting is framed as a bid to “normalise” relations after recent troop disengagements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). However, the stakes stretch far beyond a restive and contested border, which has seen clashes in 1962, 1967, and more recently at the start of this decade.
Tianjin, the northern Chinese city where the meeting is scheduled, could serve as the staging ground for a deeper reordering of the global system — possibly anchored at one end by BRICS+, the expanded bloc of emerging and middle powers that includes Russia, Brazil, South Africa, the UAE, Egypt, and Indonesia.
If Modi and Xi can even partially bridge their differences, the world’s two most populous nations could tilt the balance of geopolitical gravity toward a multipolar order rather than a unipolar one underwritten by Washington.
During his two-day visit to New Delhi, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on August 18 that Beijing was addressing India’s concerns over export curbs on fertilisers, rare earths and tunnel-boring machines.
Shadow Of Galwan & Trump Tariffs
For the Indian Prime Minister, Tianjin is both an opportunity and a hedge. Relations with Washington are deteriorating at a pace few in New Delhi had ever thought possible since the India-Pakistan war of 1971.
In late July, Donald Trump slapped punitive 50 per cent tariffs on US$ 86.5 billion worth of Indian merchandise exports, citing India’s refusal to halt crude oil imports from Russia, citing national security goals.
To many, it seemed like a reversal of three decades of India-US bonhomie over a shared concern about the rise of China. Modi had spent years cultivating President Trump as a personal ally, to the extent of even campaigning for him. To rub salt into the injuries, Trump dangled preferential trade terms to Pakistan just weeks after a terror attack in Kashmir.
The tariffs have ignited talks in India’s Ministry of External Affairs of a need to recalibrate the country’s foreign policy, which was seen to be increasingly pro-West over the last two decades.
Wither China Policy?
Diplomats on both sides are playing down expectations, but several outcomes are believed to be on the table. There is talk of possible moves towards a "no war pact". While the boundary question will remain unresolved for the foreseeable future, Modi and Xi could inch towards an in-principle nod to a “no war pact” as an intermediary step beyond the existing 1993 Peace and Tranquillity accord.
A robust verification regime — satellite monitoring, hotlines, institutionalised command-level meetings — would be essential in the low-trust environment that exists between the two Asian giants.
At the same time, talks on economic cooperation — which have been stalled for a long time — could revive. Besides allowing Chinese investments, which had been blocked due to security concerns, possible cooperation in the areas of AI, high-tech manufacturing, green transport, and WTO reforms could be taken up.
China’s cooperation in rare earth resource procurement as an interim measure till India builds its viable supply chains would be of great help to Indian automobile firms, chip manufacturers, and solar power industries, among others.
However, if India has a wishlist, China too would have one. It would like easier access to Indian data, a blanket disapproval of any Tibetan-led succession plan for the Dalai Lama, and a neutral stance on the South China Sea issue. The question is, can India afford to give in on any of these crucial issues? Or risk the public outcry that a compromise on them would necessarily follow?
The logic for a rapprochement between the elephant and the dragon is compelling. India and China share membership not only in BRICS but also in the SCO and the G20. Both maintain strong ties with Russia, a country central to any Eurasian balance of power.
Both the giants see themselves as natural leaders of the Global South, challenging the post-Cold War Western-led order. Though it may be argued that with the rise of China’s financial muscle and the demise of the Non-Aligned Movement, Beijing carries more clout in most Third World capitals, including New Delhi.
It can't be denied that the distrust between the two Asian giants is also equally real. The shadow of 1962, when China invaded much of what is now Arunachal Pradesh, and of more recent happenings at Galwan, still looms large in Indian public opinion.
Modi could risk a huge domestic backlash if the meeting or its outcomes are seen as a capitulation. For China, India’s expanding defence and nuclear ties with the United States and participation in the Quad, which is certainly directed against Beijing even though not in declared aims, will continue to be matters of great concern.
Tactical Pause Or Strategic Reset?
Mandarins at South Bloc point out that even if Tianjin produces “mere gestures of goodwill” bereft of any substantive breakthroughs, it will result in — at the very least — a “tactical pause” in hostilities.
This in turn could help stabilise the border and restore economic dialogue, and more importantly, send out a “friendly” warning signal to Washington. “A strategic reset between India and China is not on the cards. At best, it could be a tactical pause and signalling,” said a senior officer in the Ministry of External Affairs.
However, if the India-US relationship continues to go southwards under Trump’s tariff barrage, Beijing’s overtures in conjunction with Moscow’s feelers could entice Indian policymakers to a closer embrace.
In a world where Washington is increasingly unpredictable and Eurasia is reconfiguring itself, Tianjin could mark the moment when both leaders decided a dance date in the future was worth thinking about again.