COP28: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly Of The Climate Talks In Dubai

As countries delivered their closing statements, the saccharine nature of the plenary gave way to a sense of despair, infusing the hall with an unlikely hint of tension. A deal had been struck, but not all would see it as an equal outcome.

The Setup

In many ways, COP28 was unlike any other previous climate talks. It had a clear mandate to deliver a direction to climate action following the Global Stocktake, a five-year exercise laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement to assess the progress - or the lack of it – in limiting the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial levels.

Serving simultaneously as the COP President and as the head of ADNOC, Al Jaber tried hard to present his position as a unique meeting point of two seemingly opposite interests and often suggested that the UAE, a petrostate, offered the best venue to find a balanced path to achieve the goals set in Paris.

To his credit, the summit adopted the historic decision to operationalise the loss and damage fund on the very first day, after a year of difficult discussions. The presidency forged consensus at an unscheduled meeting among the parties in the run-up to the summit and set the stage for a positive opening to COP28. For its efforts in brokering the deal, the presidency was given a badge of credibility.

The inaugural win was followed by a flurry of financial pledges. But the next 10 days saw tough negotiations during which hardly any progress was made. Negotiations on crucial agenda items, including the GST and other matters relating to adaptation and mitigation strategies, remained frustratingly stuck. Divergent views and the so-called “red lines” of parties dominated the narrative.

Stepping away from the conventional process of holding iterative negotiations with all parties represented in the same room, the presidency started holding independent consultations to break the deadlock. The stated idea was to create an inclusive text, specifically for the GST.

The first draft was revealed on December 11. After some excitement, pundits began digging deeper into the text. The majority felt the draft was inconsistent and weak and read more like a wishlist than a serious legal instrument of value.

With no headway in sight, the presidency resumed consultations with the parties. After days filled with rumours and anxiety, news spread that an agreement was around the corner as a copy of the new draft text got leaked to the press, which began reporting that the language on fossil fuels had been tightened. Within hours, Al Jaber was on stage with a gavel and he unveiled the UAE Consensus.

The Good

The Global Stocktake Agreement was trimmed down to 21 pages from an earlier draft containing 27 pages. The final text was sharper than the previous drafts. Following allegations of undermining science, the presidency had laid emphasis in establishing a foundation of science in the text. Though missing in the preamble, references to the 1.5C goal had been included in the introductory paragraphs.

The language on mitigation approaches was tightened, from a suggestive tone to one that offered a prescriptive frame. The operational term should was replaced with could. For the first time under the UNFCCC negotiation process, the sector- and technological-agnosticism was abandoned and emission control approaches were laid out in detail. Targets to triple global renewable energy capacity and double the annual rate of energy efficiency improvements indicated strong intent. Importantly, the phrase on fossil fuels found a place in the final agreed text, an undoubted moment of incremental progress in climate policy and a clear acknowledgment of the need to transition away from fossil-based energy systems.

Significantly for India, language suggesting a stop to new coal power projects was dropped in favour of previously agreed framing of accelerating efforts toward a phase-down of unabated coal without any timelines. The decision establishes a dedicated technology implementation programme to facilitate the transfer and implementation of technologies in developing countries.

The text put considerable emphasis on the quantum and quality of finance needed, and legitimises the idea of generating finance through innovative measures. Significantly, the text goes some way quelling emergent trade issues and legitimises carbon-based cross border levies, with the clever caveat indicating that proceeds would be fed back into climate action.

The Bad

Unfortunately, the positives in the text dry up fairly quickly. Although, at first glance, the text may reflect ambition, it remains replete with loopholes. For example take the language on fossil fuels. The operational verb transitioning away lacks objective clarity. While the most charitable interpretation might signal a peak of fossil fuel consumption within this decade, a critical one opens the possibility of absolute use continuing to rise at a slower pace.

Moreover, the language affirming an equitable process in transition has been diluted significantly – a shift in the acknowledgement of the agreed principles of negotiations with implications on how responsibilities are differentiated between countries. Worryingly the text also lends credibility to the unproven technological fixes such as carbon capture and “transitional fuels” (often a code for gas, blended bio-fuels etc) which still carry significant emission intensities.

Significantly, the decision lays out an approach for “results-based payments” for forest- and conservation-based carbon removal projects in developing countries. Not only does this condition link financial obligations to outcomes which are often inherently unpredictable and uncertain, it thrusts the power of decision-making firmly into the funder or implementer’s hand. More significantly, when read in conjunction with the earlier dilution of equity in mitigation responsibilities, it opens the doors for developing countries to be used as sinks to offset the emissions of developed economies and other large emitters, without offering much of a chance to enjoy their fair share of the remaining carbon space for development. This is an alarming prospect which opens the doors for a kind of carbon colonialism.

Despite strong recognition of finance, there is little actionable substance on the mobilisation or approach to enhancing finance flows, particularly into adaptation-oriented action. Matters relating to adaptation, as a whole, offered very little in terms of a clear pathway or financial mechanism through the crucial decision on the Global Goal on Adaptation.

In a potentially significant blow to developing countries, the GGA decision could lead to limitations on the funding available through multilateral development banks and the overarching international financial architecture for development projects that carry an emission or biodiversity imprint (read roads, ports, rails, airports, power lines, basically any heavy infrastructure). Fortunately, terms such as “transformative adaptation” and “maladaptation avoidance” which lack standard definition and carry the threat of limiting existing finance flows will be put through further scrutiny by the UNFCCC Secretariat.

And The Ugly

Even with all its flaws, the text is not the most problematic aspect of the two-week long negotiation. Concerns around submissions not being reflected were echoed strongly during the stocktaking plenary session. These concerns continued unabated, as the presidency nearly severed all links to negotiating precedence and established conventions of joint assessments of draft texts.

The opaque nature led to rumours and drowned any possibility of a credibility mechanism for grievance redressal. A collaborative approach gave way to a corporate one, where the stakes are always high. There is no room for a failed outcome and the collateral damage is the spirit of multilateralism, solidarity, cooperation and inclusivity – all foundational tenets of the overarching legal and political charter on climate change. The biggest liability behind all of COP28’s glitter and glamour is that of trust-based multilateralism. UAE’s Presidency of COP28 set many new precedents, but in the process it may have irreparably damaged the keystone of trust keeping collaborative political action alive.

(Shreeshan Venkatesh is Editorial Head of Carbon Copy and Climate Policy Lead at Climate Trends, a consulting and capacity building initiative. This article is published in a special arrangement with Carbon Copy. Views expressed are personal)