The CRS report, recently submitted to the Railway Ministry, came after investigating the collision between Kantakapalli (KPL) and Alamanda (ALM) stations in Andhra Pradesh. Safety experts say the Railways should resolve these anomalies to avoid such collisions and make train travel safe.

On that day in 2023,  the Visakhapatnam-Rayagada passenger train (no 08504), running at 82 kmph, collided with the rear coaches of the Visakhapatnam-Palasa passenger train (no 08532), which was moving at 16 kmph, on the same line. 

Though the CRS primarily held the deceased Loco Pilot and Assistant Loco Pilot of the faster train guilty of ignoring the caution signal, the report noted that senior officers continuously overlooked such violations in the recent past.

The report also found ambiguity over rules leading to confusion and the resultant violations thereafter between the General and Subsidiary train operation rules. 

The CRS report highlighted five major flaws that need to be fixed urgently for the safe running of trains: 

Officials Overlooked Multiple Violations Earlier

On the day of the accident, the CRS found three trains had disobeyed caution signal aspects earlier but senior operating officials overlooked these violations. Not only that, 15 days before the accident, three trains had committed a similar breach of rules but it wasn't noticed. The report said a total 12 trains ignored extant rules and passed the KPL-ALM section in a shorter time duration indicating that their drivers sped their trains through caution signals.

“The reduced time should have been noticed by both the section controller as well as SM/SMR (station master/station manager) of KPL and ALM, which they didn’t report,” the CRS said.

The CRS also noted the KPL station master was informing crew of trains about signal failure using a walkie-talkie, which is against the norm.

If signals are defective, the rule states that the loco pilot is to stop the train at the signal for a minute during the day and two minutes at night and then move ahead at 10 kmph.        

In the collision, the CRS found incriminating evidence that the KPL station master asked the loco pilot of 08504 on the walkie-talkie to ignore the caution signal as it had a defect.

It was also found that due to the ambiguity of rules, the Signal and Telecom (S&T) staff , which takes care of train signals, didn’t indicate any actions or precautions that the station master or the control room should have taken after disconnecting the signal for repair work.

Employees In Crucial Safety Posts Incompetent 

This observation is worrying for passenger safety as the CRS inquiry found that staff in the control office, the nerve of the train operation, lacked the basic knowledge to make a computer entry of vital information such as disconnection memo the S&T department was supposed to serve.

“In fact, during a visit to divisional control, a randomly chosen section controller was not even aware how to enter data of disconnection memo nor was he even aware of such feature in Control Office Application,” the CRS said. 

Another aspect that came out was the inadequate training of Assistant Loco Pilots (ALP) in handling emergencies. The CRS report mentioned the Senior ALP of Train No 08532 (the train which was in front) said in his statement that he had applied emergency brakes only once in his career; on a goods train from running over cattle. 

“All ALPs should be trained (at least on Loco Simulators) like LPs to work trains so that they are in a better position to estimate when to operate the RS valve (the emergency braking system),” the CRS report said.

Mismatch Of Two Sets Of Rules 

The CRS investigation found anomalies in General Rules (GR) as well as Subsidiary Rules (SR) over the speed of trains at caution signals. While the GR says the train speed should be at 10 kmph at defective signals under low visibility, the SR says it should be 15 kmph. “Hence, there is ambiguity in allowed speed under other cases of low visibility,” the CRS noted.

The details of the CRS probe show that on October 29, 2023, the automatic signalling system between KPL and ALM failed at 6.25 am because of which two consecutive signals showed cautionary aspects.

Experts say the Railways have two signalling systems - automatic and absolute. In the automatic system, trains run according to the signal aspects; whereas in the absolute system, till a train crosses one station section, the second one is not allowed to enter the section.  

The norm also says that if the automatic system fails for a considerable amount of time, the absolute system will be introduced till it is rectified. 

On these norms, the CRS said they were badly drafted causing ambiguities and “this was the first (lack of) action which led to the accident”. For instance, considerable amount of time hasn’t been specified. According to the CRS, this should be clearly defined for safe train operations.   

Every Passenger Train's Last Two Coaches Need Crash-Worthy Features

To minimise loss of lives, the CRS recommended the Railways should have kept at least the two last coaches of passenger trains with crash-worthy features. Such coaches don’t mount one another after an accident, thus saving lives.

 “Layout of SLR (Seating-Cum-Luggage) coaches should be modified to shift the luggage portion to the two ends of the coach so that the collapsible portion is in the luggage area only,” the CRS said.

As the train manager (also known as the Guard) of the train ahead died in the accident because his coach was the last one, the CRS suggested the Guard portion should be shifted with the provision of a rearview camera and a speedometer to allow better monitoring of train speed.

Record Walkie-Talkie Conversations Between Station Masters And Loco Pilots

The CRS has recommended that the walkie-talkie conversation between station masters and loco pilots should be recorded after the investigation showed that the ALM station master guided the loco pilot of the fateful train to cross the defective signal, assuring him the line was clear.   

“Recording of conversations made by Station Masters through walkie-talkie (VHF sets) shall be ensured by providing a VHF receiver cum recorder in the Datalogger room,” the CRS said.

The Railway Ministry had asked all its zones in 2021 to make arrangements to install equipment with a voice recording facility for such conversations. Still, no one has taken any initiative in this regard.

After the CRS report, the Railway Board reiterated its earlier instructions for early implementation.