India’s NDC Conundrum: Raising Climate Ambitions Under Geopolitical Uncertainties

The EU on November 5 announced a revised target, according to which the member countries agreed to cut 90 per cent of emissions by 2040, compared to the 1990 levels.

However, this target comes with factors such as allowing countries to use 10 per cent carbon credits coming from outside Europe and reassessment of the 2040 target every two years. In the case of the revised NDCs submitted so far, many of them go beyond the mitigation targets to include aspects such as adaptation, technology-sharing, financing, and just transitions. Further, 70 per cent of the revised NDCs now plan to integrate just transitions.

This integration across different climate, environment, and economic aspects observed in the revised NDCs, coupled with the less ambitious emission cuts, suggesting that countries, both developed and developing, are adopting an inward-looking, comprehensive approach towards climate policy.

By focusing on adaptation needs, financing, and just transition issues, the revised NDCs indicate the importance of grounding the future climate actions in socio-economic and geopolitical realities. 

In terms of the specific NDCs, countries such as Japan and the US (the latter submitted the NDC before the Trump administration announced its decision to pull out of the Paris Agreement) use a linear approach to net-zero, such that their 2030 and 2035 targets fall on a linear line leading to net-zero by 2050. This works for industrialised countries with mature economies, wherein emissions have peaked and are now on a declining trajectory.

India's Upward Trend

However, for emerging economies such as India, the economic growth is still following an upward trend, and a peak and subsequent decline in emissions can only be decided after considering the developmental concerns. If we add the need to consider socio-economic wellbeing, adaptation challenges, just transition, financing, and technology needs to the equation, policymakers in India are staring at an arduous task of balancing climate policy with other domestic priorities.

Further, the changing geopolitical circumstances and trade relations are adding to the uncertainties and making it difficult to state a short-term climate target.

The energy security strategy of many countries has been fundamentally reshaped by recent geopolitical disruptions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the tensions in West Asia.

Trade barriers and protectionism are putting pressure on developing countries and making them reconsider their existing supply chains for oil and gas. In addition, the concentration of critical minerals in a few geographic regions raises the risk for large-scale renewable energy transitions.

Renewable Energy Infrastructure

Moreover, the concentration of renewable energy infrastructure presents a new type of geopolitical risk in some regions.

For example, over 60 per cent of India's large-scale solar and wind projects are concentrated in just three states — Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu — increasing vulnerability to extreme weather events, border conflicts, and cyber-attacks. These risks to energy security and technology transitions are often overlooked in climate discussions. 

Unlike the industrialised countries, emerging economies like India not only need to consider energy security but also expand their generation capacity to support the growing energy needs of 1.4 billion people.

In India, domestically fired coal power generation forms the base load for 24/7 electricity to support the growth of industries, hospitals, schools, and homes — a baseline requirement that intermittent renewable sources cannot yet guarantee at scale and cost without massive grid storage investments. The challenge of managing grid stability with increased solar capacity—available only during daytime—has reinforced the need for thermal power to continue playing a significant role in the foreseeable future. While solar power initially promised affordable generation costs, operational realities and socio-political concerns around the mining of critical minerals have raised a question on their ability to completely displace conventional energy sources from the electricity grids.

Further, growing demand in sectors like cooling and digital infrastructure is outpacing the growth in renewables, making it essential to consider other alternatives to meet the future energy demand. In such a scenario, coal remains the backbone of India's energy infrastructure, accounting for 55% of the country's energy needs. India’s coal production increased from 734 million tonnes to 1,149 million tonnes between 2018-24, ensuring a reliable domestic supply when global energy markets proved volatile. The plans for just transition away from coal are also underway at the national and subnational level, but committing to more aggressive renewable targets that accelerate coal phase-outs without concrete plans for just transitions in coal-dependent subnational economies can prove detrimental to both national and international interests in the long run.

India, however, remains firm on its net-zero target by 2070. It has already achieved 50% of total power capacity from non-fossil sources 5 years before 2030 and is on track to achieve GHG/GDP intensity commitments (45% reduction during 2005-2030). India also recently released a new blueprint for the Green India Mission, which will focus on improving the quality of carbon sequestration in the forests and trees and help achieve the additional 2.5-to-3-billion-ton CO2 mitigation through additional forest and landcover by 2030. It is now time to pause a little and take a comprehensive stock of the climate policy in the context of socio-economic and geopolitical realities of a developing economy. Based on the revised NDCs submitted so far, it seems alright to not be ambitious in the short-term but instead focus on including adaptation, financing, capacity building and just transition in the climate action plan to ensure a steady march towards the net-zero goal. 

(The writer is a research scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria. Views are personal.)